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[S]ince the only or principal dispute relates to the meaning
of [a] statutory term, the controversy must ultimately be re-
solved, not on the basis of matters within the special compe-
tence of the [agency], but by judicial application of canons
of statutory construction.
-Justice William 0. Douglas, in Barlow v. Collins1
When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this
Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the
statute by the officers or agency charged with its
administration.
-Chief Justice Earl Warren, in Udall v. Tallman
2
t Professor of Law, Boston University; B.A. 1965, Amherst College; LL.B. 1968,
Harvard University. The author is indebted for the many useful comments on earlier
drafts of this article made by participants in the legal studies workshops at Boston
University and the University of Pennsylvania. Special thanks go to C. Edwin Baker,
Stephen Burbank, Frank Goodman, John Leubsdorf, Stephen Schulhofer, and Aviam
Soifer.
1 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970).
2 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
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After a long period of relative neglect,' the subject of statutory
interpretation once again enjoys favor in the courts of academic dis-
course. Indeed, for the first time since the famous Radin-Landis debate
of 1930,4 the subject provokes sharp-even heated-exchanges among
contributors to learned journals.' The contemporary debate operates on
two levels, one epistemological, the other institutional. The epistemo-
logical controversy centers around the possibility of achieving "objectiv-
ity" in interpretation. Participants in this discussion are interested in
statutes merely as one among several forms of written text whose
meaning must be explicated by an "interpreter." In this sense, the re-
vived interest in statutory interpretation is a by-product of the emergent
interest in critical literary' and philosophica 7 theory among legal
scholars.
It is at the institutional level of contemporary debate, however,
that the peculiar social function of statutes assumes primary impor-
tance. Here, renewed attention to statutory interpretation has rekindled
debate over the proper allocation of lawmaking prerogatives between
legislatures and courts. Some commentators, most notably Guido Gala-
bresi in his recent book A Common Law for the Age of Statutes,' have
urged courts to take greater liberties with the handiwork of legislatures.
Other scholars, including Calabresi's many critics,9 advocate a more re-
served judicial posture. While unquestionably stimulating, this debate
has largely sidestepped what I view as the central question of statutory
I See Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal
Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 215 (1983).
" Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARv. L. REV. 886 (1930);
Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930).
5 See, e.g., Dworkin, My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter Benn Michaels):
Please Don't Talk About Objectivity Anymore, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION
287 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed. 1983); Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REv.
527 (1982); Fish, Wrong Again, 62 TEX. L. REV. 299 (1983); Fish, Working on the
Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 551 (1982); see
also Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982); Fiss, Objectivity
and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
6 See, e.g., Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory: Some Com-
mon Concerns of an Unlikely Pair, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 676 (1979); Law and Liter-
ature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373 (1982) (symposium).
7 See, e.g., Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretiv-
ism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). For general accounts of
the critical legal studies movement, see THE POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kairys ed. 1982);
Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983); Critical
Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
s G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
9 See, e.g. Cox, Book Review, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1463 (1982); see also Es-
treicher, Judicial Nullification: Guido Calabresi's Uncommon Common Law for a
Statutory Age (Book Review), 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1126 (1982); Mikva, Book Review,
96 HARV. L. REV. 534 (1982); Weisberg, supra note 3.
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interpretation in the "modern administrative state"'-whether admin-
istrative agencies or courts should exercise greater authority over statu-
tory interpretation. For it is a defining characteristic of the administra-
tive state that most statutes are not direct commands to the public
enforced exclusively by courts, but are delegations to administrative
agencies to issue and enforce such commands."
Two competing traditions in American jurisprudence address the
issue of the appropriate allocation of interpretive authority between
agencies and courts. One, exemplified by the opening quotation from
Barlow v. Collins,'" views matters of statutory interpretation as ques-
tions of "law" reserved for independent determination by the judici-
ary." This view stems from a "private law" conception of the judicial
function in reviewing administrative action. 4 Under this conception, a
court must independently examine an administrative agency's claimed
authority to inflict harm upon a plaintiff, just as it would assess the
legal authority of a private entity to do so.
The alternative view of the judicial function, illustrated by Chief
Justice Warren's familiar dictum in Udall v. Tallman,15 can be traced
back at least to the 1930's." This tradition views agencies as delegates,
empowered by the legislature to exercise legislative power to articulate
and implement public goals. Legislation, so conceived, is as much a
mandate as a constraint. Under this conception, courts involved in stat-
utory interpretation must provide enough leeway for agencies to give
shape to that legislative mandate."a
These two traditions have coexisted uneasily throughout the mod-
ern era of administrative law. The prolonged congressional debate over
the so-called Bumpers Amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act
is merely the latest chapter in the history of this ongoing tension. As
10 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2801 (1983)
(White, J., dissenting). The term "administrative state" dates back at least to 1948. See
D. WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1948).
11 See, e.g., J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 3 (1978); T. Lowi, THE
END OF LIBERALISM 92-126 (1979).
12 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
13 See, e.g., Hardin v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 14 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1951); NLRB
v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583, 590-91 (2d Cir. 1961). For a recent defense of
independent review, see Byse, Scope of Judicial Review in Informal Rulemaking, 33
AD. L. REV. 183, 190-93 (1981).
14 See Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1193, 1202-03 (1982); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667, 1671-76 (1975).
13 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
18 See Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933).
17 For a review of the early cases applying the doctrine, see Nathanson, Adminis-
trative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REv. 470 (1950).
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originally introduced in 1975, Senator Bumpers's bill would have com-
manded reviewing courts to decide de novo all questions of statutory
interpretation and would have removed the presumption of validity cus-
tomarily extended to administrative rules."8 The amendment quickly
became a rallying point for both critics and defenders of the modern
regulatory state. 9 While the bill's language was eventually diluted suf-
ficiently to secure its passage by the Senate,20 the controversy it touched
off continues to simmer.
This Article addresses the issue of interpretive responsibility left
unresolved by that congressional debate and largely skirted by the re-
cent literature on the theory of legal interpretation. While the Article
attempts to draw upon that literature as a basis for determining
whether agencies or courts exercise superior interpretive competence, it
does not side with any single faction in the contemporary academic de-
bate. Rather, it articulates a composite view of statutory interpretation,
as an exercise in both "finding" and "making" law, that corresponds
roughly with the prevailing judicial view. This model serves as the tem-
plate against which to assess the comparative institutional competencies
of courts and agencies as statutory interpreters.
The first two parts of the Article describe the modes of statutory
interpretation-"independent" and "deferential"-associated with the
two traditions described above. Part III then examines how courts
might go about deciding how to choose between the two modes of inter-
pretation and recommends the use of a utilitarian mode of analysis.
Parts IV and V use that approach to determine the relative competen-
cies of courts and agencies to perform the "lawfinding" and "lawmak-
ing" components of statutory interpretation. Based on that assessment,
I conclude that courts should presumptively defer to agency interpreta-
tions of statutes in situations where Congress has endowed the agency
with significant policymaking responsibility. Part VI of the Article
sketches the contours of this presumption.
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN THE INDEPENDENT MODE
Each generation has its theory of statutory interpretation.2' Just as
18 See S. 2408, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 29,956 (1975).
18 For discussions of the bill's history, see O'Reilly, Deference Makes a Difference:
A Study of Impacts of the Bumpers Judicial Review Amendment, 49 U. CIN. L. REV.
739 (1980); Woodward & Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 31 AD. L. REV. 329 (1979); Wright, Musings on Administrative Law, 33 AD.
L. REV. 177, 177-80 (1981).
20 See 125 CONG. REc. 23,504-05 (1979). The most recent version is contained in
S. 1766 & H.R. 1776, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
2 For a historical survey of changing fashions in the theory of statutory interpre-
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Pound22 and Holmes2" had attacked the textual formalism of their fore-
bears, thirty years later Realists like Max Radin would characterize
their search for "legislative intent" as "a transparent and absurd fic-
tion."2 The discredited notion of legislative intent was, in turn, resur-
rected as "statutory purpose" by the "legal process" movement of the
1950's.25 After two decades of assimilation, a new generation of textual
skeptics dismisses the feasibility of interpretive objectivity."
Throughout these trends in intellectual fashion, the underlying di-
lemmas of statutory interpretation persist. Does statutory text have any
intrinsic meaning apart from context? Is there an ascertainable "legis-
lative intent" or "statutory purpose"? Ought it to be controlling? What
evidence counts toward a determination of legislative intent or purpose?
Yet as these controversies persist, courts continue to go about the daily
business of adjudicating disputes involving conflicting claims about stat-
utory meaning. While it may be too generous to say that courts have a
unified theory of interpretation, their behavior seems, for the most part,
to fall into a discernible pattern. A description of that- pattern-which I
call the "independent mode"-serves as the baseline for my inquiry.
A. A Prototype
The Supreme Court's decision in American Tobacco Co. v. Patter-
son2 7 exemplifies the independent mode of statutory interpretation. A
group of American Tobacco's black employees had attacked the com-
pany's promotional ladder as an "unlawful employment practice" hav-
ing a racially discriminatory impact under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.28 The employer had sought protection behind section
703(h) of the Act, which immunizes the application of "a bona fide
tation in Anglo-American law, see Corry, Administrative Law and the Interpretation
of Statutes, 1 U. TORONTO L.J. 286 (1936).
22 See Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908).
23 See Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REv. 417
(1899).
2" Radin, supra note 4, at 870. See also Corry, supra note 21, at 290 ("The
intention of the legislature is a myth . . ").
25 See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 1150-57 (tentative ed. 1958). For an earlier ex-
pression, see Cox, Judge Learned Hand and The Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARv.
L. REV. 370 (1947).
21 See, e.g., S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980); Levinson, Law
as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv. 373 (1982).
27 456 U.S. 63 (1982). Although the case involves an administrative agency (the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission), the agency plays only a minor support-
ing role. None of the Justices' opinions accords the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII
any greater deference than they do the interpretation of the agency's copetitioner.
28 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h-6 (1982).
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seniority . . . system"29 from attack under the Act. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a judgment against the
company,"0 finding the section 703(h) shield inapplicable to seniority
systems, like American Tobacco's, adopted after the Act's effective date.
The Supreme Court reversed, five to four.
Justice White's opinion for the majority is a textbook illustration
of statutory interpretation in the independent mode. He began his
search for legislative guidance with the statutory text. Absent a con-
trary indication from Congress, he observed, the statutory language, as
understood in its "ordinary" sense, "must . . . be regarded as conclu-
sive." 1 Especially is this so when there is evidence-found here in re-
marks by one of the bill's sponsors-that the language of the bill re-
ceived "meticulous attention" in Congress.32 Noting the absence of any
explicit distinction between pre-Act and post-Act systems, the presence
elsewhere in the Act of explicit grandfather clauses, and the assertedly
"unreasonable results" 3 produced by the petitioners' interpretation,
Justice White found the "plain meaning" of the statutory language to
favor the employer's interpretation.
He then turned to the legislative history, but only with some trepi-
dation: "Going behind the plain language of a statute in search of a
possibly contrary congressional intent is 'a step to be taken cautiously'
even under the best of circumstances." 3'4 Since section 703(h) first ap-
peared in a substitute bill introduced on the Senate floor, the bill's leg-
islative history was more meager than is usually the case. After rum-
maging through available "fragments" 3  of legislative
history-references to seniority in a House minority report, floor re-
marks of various supporters, a Justice Department memorandum, and
interpretive memoranda written by the bill's supporters-Justice White
'9 42 U.s.c. § 2000e-2(h) (1982). The section declares that
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply
different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or priv-
ileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system,
... provided that such differeences [sic] are not the result of an intention
to discriminate because of race . ...
"O Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 634 F.2d 744, 749 (4th Cir. 1980), va-
cated, 456 U.S. 63, on remand, 691 F.2d 496 (4th Cir. 1982).
S 456 U.S. at 68 (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962), and
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
3' Id. at 68-69 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 11,935 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
Dirksen)).
33 Id. at 71.
" Id. at 75 (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977)).
35 Id.
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found the history to be "inconclusive.""6
The final support for White's construction was an asserted con-
gressional "policy favoring minimal supervision by courts and other
governmental agencies over the substantive terms of collective-bargain-
ing agreements. 3 7 Conceding that the "overall purpose" of Title VII is
"to eliminate discrimination in employment," Justice White read sec-
tion 703(h) to "balance" those two policies, and concluded that ex-
tending 703(h) immunity to post-Act seniority systems would better
promote this balance of policies than would the opposite
interpretation. 8
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan disputed each of these
three subsidiary conclusions. In his view, the statutory text "plainly"
protected only pre-Act seniority systems since it permitted employers
only to "apply" bona fide seniority systems, not to "adopt" them. The
message that he received from the legislative history, moreover, was not
"inconclusive," but emphatic in its concern to protect only accrued se-
niority rights against "retrospective" abrogation."9 And the "narrow"
purpose of section 703(h) was "to protect the expectations that employ-
ees acquire through the continued operation of a seniority system."40
To accomplish this purpose, Justice Brennan concluded, one should in-
terpret the Act to immunize only pre-Act systems.
B. Underlying Assumptions
At least in their Patterson opinions, Justices White and Brennan
appear to disagree not about the theory of statutory interpretation, but
rather about its application to the facts of the case. That apparently
shared theory of statutory interpretation has, as its central normative
principle, a notion of legislative supremacy.41 In a representative de-
mocracy, the views of the popularly elected legislature must prevail
over those of the appointed judiciary, except in areas specifically re-
served to the latter by the Constitution. Whatever its own policy view
may be, the Court's job is to discover and effectuate the legislative will
as expressed in the text of the enacted statute. Only through the for-
malities of statutory enactment can a legislature express its will, and
only through the formality of statutory amendment can that will, once
38 Id. at 71.
37 Id. at 76-77.
38 Id.
I1 d. at 83-84 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 7,213 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark)).
40 Id. at 81.
41 See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978); R.
DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 7 (1975).
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expressed, be modified or overridden.42
Yet the modern Court has not adopted a narrowly "textualist" 43
approach to statutory interpretation. Despite repeated invocation of the
"plain meaning" rule, the Supreme Court does not take statutory
words wholly out of context.44 At least implicitly, it assumes a particu-
lar speaker (Congress) and audience (usually "ordinary" people,45 but
sometimes a more specialized group 46). The Court, moreover, rarely
concludes its analysis at the textual level without at least pursuing into
the documentary underbrush of the statute's legislative history plausible
leads suggested by litigants.
41
During this interpretive search the Court clearly stamps upon the
historical materials its own idealized conception of the legislative pro-
cess.4 In the first place, the Court customarily treats the multimember
Congress as a "rational actor" capable of formulating a corporate in-
tent or purpose.49 It views statutes as means consciously adopted for the
attainment of some antecedent goal that can be inferred from the en-
acted text. 0 And to the extent that the text is ambiguous, the Court
assumes that the statute's underlying purpose can be determined from
the published proceedings of committee hearings and floor debates
without inquiry into the private conversations, markup sessions, and
conference committee meetings that many view as the "real" legislative
42 See Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congres-
sional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515, 517, 523 (1982).
4' The term is Paul Brest's. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 205 (1980).
14 See Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. REv. 195, 196-99 (1983). But cf. Note, Intent,
Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme
Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 894 (1982) (arguing that the Court "now invokes a
literalist reading of statutory terms as a surrogate for actual legislative intent") (foot-
note omitted).
"5 See, e.g., Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 618, reh'g
denied, 323 U.S. 809 (1944) (characterizing the statute in question as "addressed to the
common run of men and . . . therefore to be understood according to the sense of the
thing").
41 See, e.g., NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 326-27 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
"' See Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statu-
tory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299
(1975). For a statistical survey of the Supreme Court's invocation of legislative history,
see Carro & Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative Histories: A
Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294 (1982).
48 See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 793-96.
41 See Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1,
26-29 (1980).
80 See G. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS 32-38 (1971).
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process. 1
Implicitly, the Court has rejected possible alternative models of the
legislative process that view legislation as the product of preprogram-
med organizational routines or the result of a stylized bargaining
game. 2 An "organizational process" explanation for a particular piece
of legislation, for example, suggests that the ultimate output is shaped
by such standard operating procedures as the formal rules for enacting
bills, customary rules of privilege and courtesy, deadlines, and proce-
dures for hiring and training technical staff.53 A "bureaucratic politics"
account-of legislation, by contrast, focuses on the processes of bargain-
ing, threat, and bluff by which interpersonal conflicts are resolved. 5
This model views legislation as a loosely structured game in which self-
interested players-both within and outside the legislature-compete
for the prize of desired statutory language.
The Court is not entirely insensitive to evidence relevant to such
explanations. The majority opinion in Patterson, for instance, notes
that section 703(h) was first introduced as a floor amendment," a fact
that might imply an awareness of organizational process explanations
for legislation. Yet the Court's only apparent reason for reciting this
fact was to explain the absence of commentary from committee re-
ports.56 Similarly, the Court's practice of identifying particular mem-
bers of Congress by their role in a bill's passage (for example, sponsor
or conferee 57 ) might suggest recognition of a governmental-politics ex-
planation of the legislative process. But the Court rarely looks behind
formal designations for the de facto bargaining power on which the
micropolitical model depends. Furthermore, the Court's preoccupation
with authorship and public rationalizations bears only an attenuated
connection to the forces of leadership, discipline, log-rolling, and per-
sonal instinct thought by most social scientists to influence legislators'
votes.58
51 See Mangum, Legislative History in the Interpretation of Law: An Illustrative
Case Study, 1983 B.Y.U. L. REV. 281, 298-301; Wald, supra note 44, at 200-03.
52 See G. ALLISON, supra note 50, at 78-96, 162-81.
5 See E. REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION (1973).
See A. WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (1976). This
view is also reflected in interest group theories of legislation. See, e.g., A. BENTLEY,
THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1967); E. LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS
35 (1965).
15 456 U.S. at 72.
" See id. at 75.
'7 See, e.g., North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982)
(sponsor); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 45 (1981) (head of Senate's con-
ference delegation); American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 514-
16 (1981) (sponsors of amendments).
18 See, e.g., J. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS (1973).
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Occasionally, courts are confronted with explicit nonrational ex-
planations for the outcome of legislative deliberations. In North Haven
Board of Education v. Bell 9 the Supreme Court had to determine
whether Title IX's prohibition against sex-based discrimination in most
federally aided programs"0 extended to employees of such programs or
only to service recipients. The answer to that question depended in part
on the significance to be attached to the conference committee's deletion
of a section appearing in the original bill that explicitly excluded em-
ployment discrimination from the coverage of the Act. Arguing that this
action should be accorded little or no significance, the Board of Educa-
tion offered a quote from Representative O'Hara that the section had
originally "got in through a drafting error."6" The majority implicitly
rejected this organizational process explanation with the rational actor
assumption that if Congress had intended the courts to adopt the inter-
pretation offered by the Board, it would have said so explicitly.
62
Not only does the Court resist nonrational explanations of legisla-
tive outcomes, it also adopts a restrictive conception of the "purposes"
that animate Congress. The Court assumes that in enacting a particu-
lar statute, Congress seeks to effect some beneficial change in the gen-
eral social or economic order, not, as some have argued, to generate
"casework" opportunities for its members,63 to give symbolic reassur-
ance to the restless masses,6 or to auction its member's votes to the
highest bidder.65 Thus, for example, members of the Patterson Court
might disagree about whether the purpose of section 703(h) was to pro-
tect "the collective bargaining process1 ' 6 or employees' "expecta-
tions."67 But both of these interests, while by no means shared by the
entire "public," reflect accepted and honorable values such as self-de-
termination and promise keeping. No member of the Court would have
based an opinion on an ascribed legislative interest in saving the best
jobs for whites or assuring a continued flow of union campaign contri-
456 U.S. 512 (1982).
60 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982).
61 456 U.S. at 528 (quoting Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 409 (1975)).
62 See id. at 530.
63 See M. FIORINA, CONGRESS, KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISH-
MENT 42-49 (1977); Fiorina & Noll, Voters, Legislators, and Bureaucracy: Institu-
tional Design in the Public Sector, 68 AM. ECON. REv., May 1978, at 256, 256-57.
64 See, e.g., M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964).
65 See, e.g., Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. &
ECON. 211, 214 (1976); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON.
& MGMT. Sci. 3, 10-13 (1971).
66 456 U.S. at 76-77.
17 Id. at 81 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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butions to Democratic members of Congress. Yet, in the hard-headed
world of the public choice and interest group theorists, such are pre-
cisely the types of explanations suggested for legislative behavior.
The technique of statutory interpretation exemplified by Patter-
son, then, combines what others have called "lawfinding" and "law-
making" activities."' Courts attempt to find the meaning of the statu-
tory text as intended by the enacting legislature. Yet, by adopting
conventions to guide and constrain the search for that meaning, courts
necessarily create meaning as well. In so doing, courts have achieved
what Robert Weisberg calls the "conventional modern accommoda-
tion"69 between the "indestructible tradition of formalism in our juris-
prudence"70 and the "demand for intellectual coherence in our compre-
hensive view of legal rules and principles.""
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN THE DEFERENTIAL MODE
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson2 illustrates statutory inter-
pretation in the "independent mode" in the sense that the Court speci-
fies what the statute at issue means without regard for the way in
which any other nonlegislative entity would interpret the statute. To be
sure, the Court does entertain arguments by those who favor one inter-
pretation or another. But those suggested interpretations compete on an
equal a priori footing with each other. One party's position may, of
course, be intrinsically more plausible or convincing than the other's.
But the pedigree of an interpretation-that is, the identity of its spon-
sor or author-itself has no impact either on the method of analysis
used by the Court or on the outcome of the case.
When one of the contested statutory interpretations has been
adopted or endorsed by an administrative agency with at least prima
facie responsibility for the statute's enforcement, however, courts often
claim to accord a distinctive status to that interpretation. This status is
customarily referred to as "deference." I use the term "deferential
mode" to describe the method of statutory interpretation in such cases.
The question explored in this section is how the deferential mode dif-
fers from the independent mode.
68 See Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History, 11
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1127-28 (1983). The distinction has been drawn by numerous
other commentators. See, e.g., Cohen, Judicial "Legisputation" and the Dimensions of
Legislative Meaning, 36 IND. L.J. 414, 418 (1961); Witherspoon, The Essential Focus
of Statutory Interpretation, 36 IND. L.J. 423, 441 (1961).
"9 Weisberg, supra note 3, at 234.
70 Id. at 217.
7. Id. at 234.
7-2 456 U.S. 63 (1982).
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A. Theme
Justice White's majority opinion in Federal Election Commission
v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee 3 contains a particu-
larly self-conscious methodological statement about deferential analysis.
That case raised the issue whether the national senatorial campaign
committee of a political party, otherwise forbidden by the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act of 19717 4 from making expenditures on behalf of
senatorial candidates, may do so as the agent of a state campaign com-
mittee allowed to make such expenditures.7 Certain state Republican
committees had designated the National Republican Senatorial Com-
mittee (NRSC) as their agent to expend their funds on behalf of Re-
publican senatorial candidates in their states."' The Federal Election
Commission (FEC), which has authority to enforce the statute,7 dis-
missed a complaint lodged by the Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Committee (DSCC). The DSCC then challenged the FEC's action in
court on the ground that the statute forbade state political parties from
delegating to any other partisan committee their express statutory au-
thority to make expenditures on behalf of candidates. 8 The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, after de-
ciding that the FEC's interpretation merited no deference,79 concluded
that the statute's "plain language" forbade such delegations.80
The Supreme Court rejected both the methodology and the analy-
sis of the court of appeals. According to Justice White's opinion, the
proper sequence of judicial review of administrative decisions involves
analysis of text and legislative history first and deference to administra-
tive interpretation second, not vice versa. "[T]he courts are the final
authorities on issues of statutory construction. They must reject admin-
istrative constructions . . . that are inconsistent with the statutory man-
date or that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement.""1
73 454 U.S. 27 (1981).
74 Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
titles 2, 5, 18, 26 & 47 of the United States Code).
7' Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. at 28, 29.
78 See id. at 30.
'7 The case involved interpretation of two sections of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971: 2 U.S.C. § 441a(h) (1982) (authorizing national party senatorial
committees to contribute funds (up to a ceiling) to a senatorial candidate), and 2
U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3) (1982) (authorizing national and state party committees to make
expenditures (up to a ceiling) on behalf of a senatorial candidate).
78 Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 660
F.2d 773, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev'd, 454 U.S. 27 (1981).
79 Id. at 776-77.
80 Id. at 778-82.
8' Democratic Senatorial Campaign. Comm., 454 U.S. at 32 (citation omitted).
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If the administrative action under review conflicts with the "plain lan-
guage of the Act as well as the statutory purposes revealed by the legis-
lative history,"82 the issue of deference is irrelevant: the court must in-
validate the action. By the same token, if the statute expressly
commands or sanctions the administrative action, inquiry into deference
is unnecessary.8 3
The Court found neither situation to be the case. While section
441a(d)(3) of the Act authorized only "[t]he national committee of a
political party, or a State committee of a political party" to make ex-
penditures on a candidate's behalf,"4 the statute did not expressly forbid
these committees from designating campaign committees such as NRSC
as their agents."' Nor did section 441a(h), by expressly authorizing
committees such as NRSC to make contributions to candidates, evince
an intention to preclude them from making campaign expenditures on
their behalf as an agent of a state committee.8 6 Some desultory foraging
in off-the-cuff policy arguments, analogies, and legislative history fur-
nished Justice White with no "plainer" indication of statutory
meaning.
8 7
The Supreme Court also disagreed with the court of appeals in
ruling that deference be accorded the FEC's interpretation of the stat-
ute. 8 Not only did the FEC's broad policymaking and enforcement
powers make it "precisely the type of agency to which deference should
presumptively be afforded,"8 9 but its position on the issue of agency
agreements had been clear, consistent, and well considered.90 As such,
the FEC's position needed only be "'sufficiently reasonable' to be ac-
cepted by a reviewing court,"9' and not "the only reasonable [reading]
or even the reading the court would have reached if the question ini-
tially had arisen in a judicial proceeding." '92 The FEC's position
cleared this relaxed hurdle with ease, as the Court once again trotted
out the assertedly ambiguous statutory language along with some new
arguments from analogy, policy, and purpose.93
82 Id. at 31.
83 Id. at 32-33.
84 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3) (1982).
85 Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. at 33.
86 Id. at 35.
87 Id. at 32-36.
88 Id. at 37.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 39 (quoting Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60,
75 (1975)).
92 Id. at 39.
93 Id. at 39-42.
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B. Variations
As a methodological treatise on the role of deference in judicial
review of administrative action, Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Committee illustrates the prevailing judicial orthodoxy. That orthodoxy
consists of three tenets:
(1) Only if the statute's "plain" meaning (as illuminated by
judicial examination of its text and history) fails to solve the
riddle is an inquiry into deference appropriate. 4
(2) The decision whether to grant deference depends on vari-
ous attributes of the agency's legal authority and functions
and of the administrative interpretation at issue.
9 5
(3) The consequence of granting deference is to convert the
court's task from determining whether the contested inter-
pretation is correct to determining .whether it is
"reasonable." 9
There are, however, divergent strains in the Court's administrative
review jurisprudence. One is the notion that deference has a dimension
of "weight." In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,9" for example, the Court
accorded "great" deference to guidelines issued by the Equal Employ-
9' See, e.g., Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. at 32.
" A partial list of the factors cited by the Court would include: (1) whether the
agency construction was rendered contemporaneously with the statute's passage, see,
e.g., Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933); (2)
whether the agency's construction is of longstanding application, see, e.g., NLRB v.
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974); (3) whether the agency has maintained
its position consistently (even if infrequently), see, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,
293 (1981); (4) whether the public has relied on the agency's interpretation, see, e.g.,
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 18 (1965); (5) whether the interpretation involves a
matter of "public controversy," see, e.g., United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544,
545 (1979); (6) whether the interpretation is based on "expertise" or involves a "tech-
nical and complex" subject, see, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Central Lincoln People's
Util. Dist., 52 U.S.L.W. 4716, 4719 (U.S. June 5, 1984) (No. 82-1071); (7) whether
the agency has rulemaking authority, see, e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 793 (1978); (8) whether agency action is necessary to set
the statute in motion, see, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565-
66 (1980); (9) whether Congress was aware of the agency interpretation and failed to
repudiate it, see, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1965); and (10) whether the
agency has expressly addressed the application of the statute to its proposed action, see,
e.g., Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 627-28 (1971).
96 The Court has used various expressions for this idea. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co.
v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979) ("reasonably defensible"); NLRB v. Hearst Publi-
cations, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) ("reasonable basis in law"); Dobson v. Com-
missioner, 320 U.S. 489, 501 (1943) ("rational basis" in the law); Gray v. Powell, 314
U.S. 402, 411, 413 (1941) ("just and reasoned" and "sensible exercise of judgment").
97 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), as "the administrative inter-
pretation of the [Civil Rights] Act by the enforcing agency."" 8 In Gen-
eral Electric Co. v. Gilbert,99 by contrast, a divided Court refused to
give "great" deference to an EEOC guideline, noting an inconsistency
in the agency's position over time.1"' Similarly, in United States v. Vo-
gel Fertilizer Co., 10' the Court gave "less" deference to a Treasury
regulation issued under a "general," rather than "specific," grant of
rulemaking authority." 2
Another apparent variation from the approach in Democratic Sen-
atorial Campaign Committee is the Court's willingness in some cases to
begin its inquiry with an examination of deference. In upholding the
Federal Communication Commission's "entertainment formats" policy
in FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild,03 the majority opinion launched
quickly into an examination of the scope of the FCC's policymaking
discretion, and concluded that its judgment is "entitled to substantial
judicial deference.""0 " Only then did the Court look to the legislative
history for the insights it might yield.105 Perhaps WNCN can be har-
monized with Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee by an argu-
ment that hopelessly vague statutory delegations, such as the FCC's
"public interest" standard, permit a court to bypass the "plain mean-
ing" step. 0 6 But it is not only in the context of obviously vague statutes
that the Court reverses the sequence prescribed in Democratic Senato-
rial Campaign Committee. In Batterton v. Francis,1 07 for example, the
Court engaged in an extended discussion of deference before analyzing
a statutory provision authorizing extension of welfare benefits to chil-
dren deprived of support by their father's "unemployment."108
Finally, the Court occasionally resolves challenges to administra-
tive action without any discussion of deference whatsoever.'0 9 To be
98 Id. at 433-34.
9 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
100 Id. at 142.
101 455 U.S. 16 (1982).
102 Id. at 24. See also Rowan v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981).
103 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
'0 Id. at 596.
10I See id. at 597.
108 See National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476
(1979) (where statutory term has "no well-defined meaning or common usage," a court
"customarily defers to the [agency's] regulation").
107 432 U.S. 416, 426 (1977).
108 Id. at 426-27. See also Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 266 (1982); Schweiker
v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981). For an example from a different context, see
Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528 (1977) (tax code).
109 See, e.g., NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322 (1981) (where Congress
uses terms with settled meanings, the Court must infer that Congress intended those
meanings); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1980) (in absence of conflict be-
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sure, the orthodox rule requires this result if the statute's "plain mean-
ing" disposes of the controversy. But the relevant statutory meaning in
such cases is often-to judge by the intensity of the dissents or one's
own intuition-anything but "plain." In FCC v. Midwest Video
Corp.,"10 for instance, the Court overturned a rule requiring certain
cable television systems to provide access channels, without so much as
a mention of the deference with which the Court was so lavish in
WNCN. In so doing the Court relied on what the dissent correctly
identified as incompletely quoted language from a circular definition in
the nonoperational introduction to the Communications Act.1"
C. Puzzles
There is, of course, no reason to expect greater consistency in the
Court's treatment of administrative interpretations than in its other ac-
tions.1 1 2 Indeed, a legal realist might dismiss all this judicial talk of
deference as so much justificatory rhetoric. According to this account,
courts always independently decide how they think a statute should be
read. If that interpretation coincides with the position of the adminis-
tering agency, the court may base the outcome on deference in order to
shift responsibility for the policy judgment onto someone else who can
bear the blame for its unfavorable consequences or political rejection." 3
Undoubtedly, deference sometimes serves this function. But I can-
not accept a view of deference as nothing other than justificatory ritual.
Indeed, if deference serves no purpose other than to obscure the Court's
implementation of its own values, debate over whether and when defer-
ence is appropriate becomes pointless. I accept the Court's characteriza-
tions of deference as both a factor in the decisionmaking process and an
explanation for its outcome. This acceptance invites the question of ex-
actly how deference affects the Court's interpretive process. What do
courts do when they "defer" to an agency's construction? How, if at
tween plain meanings and legislative history, words of the statute prevail); Tennessee
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978) (ordinary meaning of statute's plain
language governs).
110 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
... See id. at 710.
.12 See Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802, 811-
31 (1982).
11I See Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1,
15 (1984) ("Judicial rhetoric about deference to the 'political branches' and to adminis-
trative expertise, of course, is commonplace. Such talk is a venerable aspect of the
courts' protective coloration, and should not be taken too seriously."); see also Gellhorn
& Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771, 780
(1975); Rabin, Administrative Law in Transition: A Discipline in Search of an Or-
ganizing Principle, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 120, 130 (1977).
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all, does deference alter the manner in which courts conduct their in-
quiry or reach their decision?
Courts and commentators who speak the language of deference
tend not to confront these questions squarely. They use the term "def-
erence" and others like it" 4 as though such terms were self-defining.
But the idea has several plausible meanings. At one extreme, deference
might mean nothing more than "respectful or courteous regard." ' 5
Perhaps this is what Justice Jackson meant in his famous passage on
judicial review in Skidmore v. Swift & Co." 6 Answering his own ques-
tion of "what, if any, deference courts should pay" ' to interpretive
bulletins of the Federal Wage and Hour Administrator, Jackson ob-
served, "The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will de-
pend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power
to control.'1 1 8 Of course, the "weight" assigned to any advocate's posi-
tion is presumably dependent upon the "thoroughness evident in its
consideration" and the "validity of its reasoning." Deference in this
sense is no more than "courteous regard." The argument's pedigree
adds nothing to the persuasive force inherent in its reasoning. 1 9
At the other extreme, "deference" might mean that an administra-
tive interpretation is decisive as to the statute's meaning. An alternative
dictionary definition of "submission or yielding to the judgment. . . of
another"' 120 has this connotation. Perhaps this is what Justice Jackson
meant by "power to control."' 21 An administrative interpretation "con-
trols" a court when the court "submits" to it. Submission implies that
no countervailing consideration can ever overturn the administrative
position.
Courts generally use "deference" in an intermediate sense, be-
14 Such terms include "weight," see, e.g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S.
34, 44 (1981), and "respect," see, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
"I See AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 317 (1952).
116 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
117 Id. at 139.
11I Id. at 140.
11' A second weak sense of "deference" that need not delay us relates solely to the
sequence of decision: a court defers to an agency by permitting it to "go first." Defer-
ence in this sense is addressed under the rubrics of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion
of remedies. For present purposes, I assume that the agency has in fact already taken a
position on the interpretive question before the court. See sources cited infra notes 134-
35.
110 See AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 317 (1952).
121 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. Elsewhere, Jackson described the Administrator's
interpretation as "not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority," id., and
as not "conclusive" or "bind[ing]," id. at 139.
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tween "courteous regard" and "submission." The fact that a particular
interpretation bears the administering agency's imprimatur counts in its
favor, but not decisively. Courts exercise independent judgment on the
meaning of a statute, but in so doing, they give a special recognition to
the agency's views. Thus, courts will accept any "reasonable" or "per-
missible" administrative construction, rather than search for the (only)
"correct" interpretation. 122 Judicial proclivity to recognize relative
weights or degrees of deference indicates this intermediate view, since
"submission" (in the sense of substituting the agency's view for the
court's judgment) is a one-dimensional concept.
But how does the fact of administrative sponsorship operate upon
the Court's decisionmaking process? A court might simply treat it as an
additional datum to be tossed into the balance along with other scraps
of evidence for and against the competing arguments. Judicial opinions
invoking deference seemingly as an afterthought suggest this treat-
ment. 123 But courts do not explicitly balance agency sponsorship
against competing arguments as they so often balance interests in other
contexts. 24 Nor is it evident how such an additive approach would co-
exist with the essentially sequential method of analysis characteristic of
the independent mode.
Deference might alternatively be understood as a kind of "eviden-
tiary" rule-a filter through which a court views conventional evidence
or arguments about statutory meaning. A deferential filter might, for
instance, systematically screen out evidence of a certain type, such as
postenactment legislative statements or analogies drawn from other
statutes. But there is no a priori reason to believe that any particular
category of evidence or argument will support or undercut an adminis-
trator's position. Nor is there any direct evidence that deferential courts
fail to examine precisely the same sorts of material that courts examine
in the independent mode. 25
Perhaps it is more plausible to think of deference as a lens. Defer-
ential courts, while examining the same evidence as independent courts,
might see it in a new light. Judges might be inclined to trust adminis-
122 See, e.g., National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 484
(1979) (upholding agency's reading of statute, though "not the only possible one");
Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 534, 536 (1978) (accepting "reasonable"
agency position, despite fact that competing interpretation had "logical force").
12I See, e.g., American Paper Inst. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S.
402, 422-23 (1983); EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 83 (1980).
124 See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (determining
requirements of procedural due process).
.25 An example is Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., where the Court ex-
amined-not once, but twice-the text, legislative history, and statutory purpose. Dem-
ocratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. at 32-36, 39-42.
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trative interpretations of statutes more than other interpretations. Per-
haps this is what courts mean when they defer to administrative "ex-
pertise"' 2 -that agencies are more expert than laypeople at extracting
meaning from ambiguous statutory words or equivocal statements by
legislators. Similarly, "contemporaneous constructions"'127 may impress
judges for the same reason that many people find eyewitness accounts
more reliable than subsequent reconstructions.
Aside from such ambiguous and occasional hints, however, judicial
opinions offer little direct support for the "lens" analogy. The manner
in which deferential courts approach legislative materials is not obvi-
ously different from' that characteristic of independent analysis. The
lens model suggests, for instance, that courts would invoke "deference"
to resolve ambiguities about particular inputs into the interpretive pro-
cess-whether Congress intended to use words in an "ordinary" or
technical sense, or what significance to attach to the deletion of a bill's
provision. But courts ordinarily do not. Nominally, at least, they "de-
fer" to the agency's overall interpretation, not the component judgments
upon which the ultimate choice rests. Courts respond to an agency's
suggested interpretation with greater confidence than they do to another
party's proposal. Deference, in effect, reduces the level of confidence
necessary for a court to uphold an interpretation.
As the Supreme Court explained in according deference to a Trea-
sury regulation in Fulman v. United States,'28 the agency's position
"must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with
the revenue statutes.' 2 9 Conceding that the'taxpayer's position had
"logical force"'3 ° and "might well prevail"''1 in the absence of a Trea-
sury regulation, the majority found the administrative interpretation
sufficiently "reasonable" to be sustained." 2 In other words, the Court's
duty is no longer to impose upon the intractable material of statutory
language and legislative history a uniquely correct interpretation, but
merely to determine whether the agency's proffered construction meets
some threshold level of acceptability.
128 See, e.g., Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 413
(1982); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980).
127 See, e.g., American Paper Inst. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S.
402, 422 (1983); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 272-73 (1981); Udall v. Tallman, 380
U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
128 434 U.S. 528 (1978).
12 Id. at 533 (quoting Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496,
501 (1948)).
130 Id. at 534.
131 Id. at 536.
132 Id.
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III. STRUCTURING THE INQUIRY INTO INTERPRETIVE
RESPONSIBILITY
The choice between deferential and independent review is really
about the allocation of interpretive responsibility between administra-
tive agencies and courts.'33 Those two allocational alternatives lie in the
midsection of a spectrum of possible assignments, ranging from exclu-
sive agency interpretation to exclusive judicial interpretation. This Arti-
cle does not attempt to explore the two poles of this spectrum. The
question when a court should interpret a statute without first giving an
administrative agency an opportunity to express its opinion ii addressed
by the doctrines of "exhaustion of remedies"'3 4 and "primary jurisdic-
tion,""3 5 whose intricacies I do not attempt to disentangle here. Nor do
I dwell on the opposite extreme. While courts can theoretically confer
exclusive interpretive power on agencies by declining jurisdiction, they
rarely do so in practice. To overcome the well-established presumption
in favor of judicial review'3 6 would require either a clear legislative
statement or else other exceptional circumstances.""
Rather than address these extremes, I assume a situation in which
an agency's opinion about the meaning of a statute, formulated in the
course of carrying out its duties as it defines them, has been challenged
in a petition for judicial review seeking to overturn the agency's action.
As a practical matter, then, a reviewing court must choose between in-
dependent interpretation and deferential interpretation. In making that
choice, courts might resort either to the command of some authoritarian
133 See McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1166 (1977).
134 See generally Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 48 YALE L.J.
981 (1939); Fuchs, Prerequisites to Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action,
51 IND. L.J. 817, 859-911 (1976).
18' See generally Botein, Primary Jurisdiction: The Need for Better Courtl
Agency Interaction, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 867 (1976); Convisser, Primary Jurisdic-
tion: The Rule and Its Rationalizations, 65 YALE L.J. 315 (1956).
18 See, e.g., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1970); Abbott Laboratories
v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sand-
ers, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).
137 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410
(1971); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967); Rusk v. Cort, 369
U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962). Each of these cases was overruled on other grounds by
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977); see also Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial
Review in the Processing of Claims for Veterans' Benefits: A Preliminary Analysis, 27
STAN. L. REV. 905, 905-07 (1975) (discussing rare instance of an explicit congressional
barrier to judicial review of administrative action); Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A
Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REV. 367,
370 (1968) ("committed to agency discretion" doctrine, codified in Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, expresses a general presumption against review "contrary to the general
presumption for review").
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principle derived from the positive law or to the results of an instru-
mental calculus.
A. Positive Law
The United States Constitution might once have been understood
to settle the question in favor of independent review. After all, the Con-
stitution clearly vests the "judicial power" in courts, not administrative
agencies.'" 8 If it is, as Chief Justice Marshall declared, "emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is,"13 9 article III would seem to dictate independent judicial review of
all statutes. Deferential review would effectively delegate to a nonjudi-
cial agency a power vested in the courts by the founders, thus violating
the maxim delegata potestas non potest delegari.1
40
Modern administrative law has not, of course, worked out that
way. Nor is there any necessity that it should. As Henry Monaghan
has convincingly shown, courts do not necessarily abdicate a Marshal-
lian duty to "say what the law is" by deferring to agencies.1 41 Courts
retain the authority to control administrative abuses of power; deferen-
tial review simply recasts the question of "law" as whether the agency's
interpretation is "reasonable."
In an earlier era we might have resisted granting deference to an
agency's statutory interpretations for a different reason. The power to
choose freely among "reasonable" interpretations is, in essence, the
power to make law. And since article I vests the "legislative power"
exclusively in Congress, 42 one might argue that any bestowal of that
power upon agencies would be improper. But, again, history has over-
whelmed logic. In an age that freely accepts explicit delegations of
broad rulemaking authority,1 43 the degree of lawmaking discretion im-
plicit in a deferential standard of review will scarcely raise an eyebrow.
So long as that delegation, like more explicit ones, is circumscribed by
substantive standards and procedural regularities, no constitutional bar-
rier will arise.
1 44
138 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
139 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
140 A delegated power cannot be delegated.
141 Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLuM. L. REv. 1,
27-28 (1983).
141 U.S. CONS'r. art. I, § 1.
143 See, e.g., Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation,
68 CORNELL L.J. 1, 7-17 (1982); Schwartz, Of Administrators and Philosopher-
Kings: The Republic, the Laws, and Delegations of Power, 72 Nw. U.L. Rav. 443
(1977).
144 A growing number of commentators have called for revival of the delegation
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Statutory law itself is a source of positive law that may offer courts
guidance in determining the correct mode of statutory interpretation.
Indeed, as the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
recently stated, "The extent to which courts should defer to agency in-
terpretations of law is ultimately 'a function of Congress' intent on the
subject as revealed in the particular statutory scheme at issue.' ",145 The
courts must, in other words, follow the legislature's "interpretative in-
tent"14 as much as its substantive intent. In some instances courts may
find explicit evidence of a legislative intention concerning the choice of
interpretive method. In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 47 for in-
stance, the Supreme Court granted "a high degree of deference"'14 to
the Federal Reserve Board's interpretation of a provision in the Truth
in Lending Act. Among other things, the Court relied on
language in the legislative history [that] evinces a decided
preference for resolving interpretive issues by uniform ad-
ministrative decision, rather than piecemeal through litiga-
tion. Courts should honor that congressional choice. Thus,
while not abdicating their ultimate judicial responsibility to
determine the law, judges ought to refrain from substituting
their own interstitial lawmaking for that of the [agency], so
long as the latter's lawmaking is not irrational. 49
But clear evidence of interpretive intent such as the Court claimed
to have found in Milhollin is a rarity. Congress seldom provides ex-
plicit guidance, even in legislative history, on how it wishes courts to
interpret statutory language. Statutes that speak at all to the issue gen-
erally incorporate one or more of the elastic formulations enshrined in
section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, directing reviewing
courts to "decide all relevant questions of law, interpret . . . statutory
provisions, . . . [and] hold unlawful . . .agency actions. . . found to
be . . .arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
doctrine. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131-34 (1981); McGowan,
supra note 133, at 1127-30; Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice (Book Review), 81
YALE L.J. 575, 582-87 (1972). But even their proposals would probably leave un-
touched the range of administrative lawmaking power implicit in deferential review.
145 Process Gas Consumers Group v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 694
F.2d 778, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (quoting Constance v. Secretary of Health &
Human Servs., 672 F.2d 990, 995 (1st Cir. 1982)), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 905 (1983).
See also Monaghan, supra note 141, at 31 n.184.
148 Brest, supra note 43, at 215-16. Although Brest is interested in constitutional
interpretation, he speaks generically of an "adopter's" interpretive intent.
147 444 U.S. 555 (1980).
148 Id. at 557.
149 Id. at 568 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 133:549
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
not in accordance with law . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, au-
thority or limitations, or short of statutory right."15 The phrases "de-
cide all relevant questions of law" and "interpret statutory provisions"
suggest an independent mode of review for all questions of statutory
interpretation. But that conclusion is not absolutely compelled. One can
"decide" a question of law while extending deference in most or all of
the senses discussed in the previous section. The "question of law" then
becomes whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable. 51 And the
simultaneous availability of a concededly deferential standard like "ar-
bitrary and capricious" leaves courts with an essentially unguided
choice.
B. A Utilitarian Approach
Absent dispositive guidance from the positive law, courts must re-
sort to jurisprudential principles for choosing between independent and
deferential review. One could refer the question to what Ronald Dwor-
kin has called an "ideal" jurisprudential argument derived from a sys-
tem of absolute rights or fundamental values. 52 An example of such an
argument is Jerry Mashaw's effort to identify the "dignitary values"
embodied in our liberal-democratic traditions.1 53 But Mashaw's own
analysis suggests the futility of invoking fundamental values or absolute
rights to settle the allocation of interpretive authority between courts
and agencies. The few process values that Mashaw finds worthy of
recognition as absolute rights-equality, comprehensibility, and pri-
vacy 54 -are too crude to support a choice between independent and
deferential review. Equality requires only that the mode of review se-
lected be applied without regard to the litigants' identity. Comprehensi-
bility demands only that the interpreter-whomever it may
be-articulate reasons for its decision. And neither deferential nor inde-
pendent interpretation seem to pose a threat to individual privacy.
Mashaw identifies other values plausibly implicated by the choice
of decisionmaking structures, such as participation, revelation, and fra-
ternity. 55 But he finds them to be too ambiguous, derivative, or inter-
nally contradictory to qualify for treatment as absolute rights. At most,
these values deserve recognition in some sort of "prudential" balancing
150 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
151 See Monaghan, supra note 141, at 26-27.
152 R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 232 (1978).
s Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61
B.U.L. REV. 885 (1981).
154 Id. at 924-25.
155 Id. at 902-06.
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of interests. 56
An explicitly utilitarian analysis seems far better suited to the task
of engineering our social apparatus for interpreting statutes. That ac-
tivity requires more finely calibrated tools than "fundamental values"
or "absolute rights." A utilitarian calculus, by aggregating and compar-
ing the costs and benefits of alternative modes, can better perform that
function. Viewing interpretation as a process with the potential to en-
hance or diminish social welfare, courts should ask which allocation
will produce the highest quality outputs for the lowest cost.
1. Cost
Statutory interpretation is a costly process involving research,
analysis, deliberation, and explanation. Other things being equal, we
should prefer a method of interpretation that minimizes these costs.
There are two reasons why deferential review might consume fewer
social resources than independent review. First, a deferential posture
may simplify the reviewing court's task. Instead of determining which
of two or more competing interpretations is the correct one, it asks only
whether the agency's interpretation is "reasonable." Thus, a deferential
court may examine fewer options than an independent court. Further-
more, the court's inquiry into those options may be less probing since it
will not be fully responsible for the ultimate interpretation. 1" There
is, however, little direct support for this hypothesis in reported opinions
since, as indicated earlier, courts do not explicitly utilize deference as
an "evidentiary" rule.158 Most deferential courts seem to examine the
same range of extrinsic sources as do independent courts. The cost sav-
ing attributable to this effect, then, is probably quite modest.
Deferential review may have a more substantial effect on interpre-
tation costs by discouraging petitions for judicial review in the first
place. By raising the probability that an agency position will be sus-
tained on appeal, a rule of deference will reduce the value of a judicial
appeal to persons adversely affected by an agency's interpretation. As-
suming that the rule of deference is clear enough to be correctly under-
stood by potential litigants, it should marginally reduce the volume of
petitions filed and therefore the number of review petitions heard. The
precise magnitude of such an effect is impossible to gauge, however,
158 Id. at 921-22.
157 Cf Cox, supra note 9, at 1472-73 (expressing concern that if a court is not
bound by legislative intent, it will "break off the search for legislative intent earlier and
more often").
15' See supra text accompanying notes 125-27.
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since the total cost of interpretive activities depends on other variables.
A reduction in cases filed might simply decrease the number of cases
settled without affecting the number litigated." 9 Also, anticipating a
more hostile reception at the judicial stage, private parties might invest
more heavily at the administrative stage. As a general matter, however,
it seems a safe assumption that a presumption of deferential review will
have a favorable impact on interpretation costs.
2. Quality
To make qualitative comparisons among the products of different
interpreters is much more difficult. One must first specify the "output"
of the interpretive process. The proximate output is an "interpreta-
tion"-that is, a statement made by a particular speaker, having a par-
ticular content and form. Like other writings,1 60 a statutory interpreta-
tion is a form of communication. Consequently, an intermediate output
is the understanding that it produces in the minds of its audience. Since
statutory interpretation is a form of legal communication, moreover, its
ultimate output is the change of behavior induced by that
understanding.
6 1
Second, one must specify standards for the evaluation of those out-
puts. The choice of evaluative criteria depends on one's underlying the-
ory of statutory interpretation. One who views interpretation as
lawfinding will judge an interpretation by its fidelity to the existing
"law," as somehow discoverable by examining such extrinsic sources as
the textual meaning "intended" by the enactor or "understood" by the
audience. One who views interpretation as lawmaking, by contrast, will
judge an interpretation by its fidelity to the interpreter's values, or per-
haps the evaluator's values.
As American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson'62 illustrates, courts have
not cast their lot exclusively with either conception, but rather have
adopted a composite approach that incorporates both. Consequently,
our quality measure must incorporate both conceptions of interpreta-
tion. In order to allocate interpretive responsibility between agencies
and courts, one must assess their relative abilities to perform both
functions.
"I See generally Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
1"0 See Abraham, supra note 6.
.1 See Fiss, supra note 5, at 750 (law-interpreters seek to be "efficacious").
162 456 U.S. 63 (1982); see supra text accompanying notes 68 & 69.
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IV. INTERPRETIVE COMPETENCE: INTERPRETATION AS
LAWFINDING
Conventional wisdom views courts as superior to agencies at
lawfinding. James Landis argued, for example, that courts are "ex-
pert" at the business of interpreting statutes."6 3 Here, as elsewhere,
however,16 4 claims of expertise tend to obscure more than illuminate. A
claim of interpretive expertise might be based on any one of three pos-
sible grounds: (1) access to greater knowledge or evidence of statutory
meaning; (2) an interpretive process better suited to yielding correct
solutions; or (3) motivation by a set of preferences more conducive to
accurate identification of statutory meaning. This section examines
these three claims in order.
A. Knowledge
1. The Enactor's Intent
Since agencies and courts have equal access to statutory text,
claims of superior knowledge must rest upon those secondary sources of
meaning to which lawfinders look in their search for the authoritative
meaning of the text. The most important of these secondary sources is
the enactor's "intention." Since the enactor of a statute is a corporate
body, its intent is presumably a composite of the intentions of some or
all of its constituent members.' 65 A search for legislative intent, then,
would require two kinds of knowledge: knowledge about the intentions
of individual legislators, and knowledge about the conventions for ag-
gregating those individual intentions into a corporate intent.
As discussed earlier,'66 judicial methods of unearthing legislative
intent are primitive and naive given contemporary standards of social
science. Courts rely almost exclusively on the recorded public state-
ments of immediate participants in the legislative process, and almost
never probe into legislators' unspoken motives.1 67 When called upon to
188 J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 154-55 (1938); see also Hardin v.
Kentucky Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 14 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that the
meaning of a statutory term "presents issues on which courts, and not [agencies] are
relatively more expert").
'I" See, e.g., Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 AD. L.
REV. 363 (1976). For a ringing indictment of one agency's supposed expertise, see
Getman & Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39 U. CHi. L. REv. 681
(1972).
"85 See Mac Callum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754, 767-68 (1966).
188 See supra text accompanying notes 52-62.
187 See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLuM. L.
REV. 527, 542-44 (1947); Moore, The Semantics ofJudging, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 151,
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aggregate individual statements into a composite corporate intent,
moreover, courts rely on an "agency" modelx1 8 that assumes that formal
rules of legislative organization accurately represent the true process.
Assuming that judges, as worldly citizens, understand legislative
politics as well as social scientists do,16 9 how can we account for their
idealized model of legislation? One common explanation is limited judi-
cial capacity. As Richard Posner argues, "Courts do not have the re-
search tools that they would need to discover the motives behind legisla-
tion."'170 By this account, agencies would seem to have a distinct
advantage over courts. In addition to equal access to the published
sources consulted by courts, agencies also possess many of the "tools"
that Posner claims courts .lack-including permanent investigative
staffs, specific analytical skills, and political sophistication.
Agency decisionmakers often have direct knowledge of the circum-
stances surrounding enactment of the statutes that they administer.
Such knowledge may be derived from personal participation in that
process171 or from close and frequent contact with other participants.
To the extent that lawfinding entails an accurate reconstruction of the
enactors' actual intentions, then, we should conclude that administrative
agencies will interpret statutes more accurately than courts.
2. Audience Understanding
The goal of honoring the enactor's intention must be balanced,
however, with the goal of avoiding unfair surprise to those whose inter-
ests are directly affected by the legislation. 72 As Lon Fuller has ar-
gued, the "inner morality" of law requires that it be comprehensible to
those whose conduct it regulates. 1 ' A statute whose meaning can be
ascertained only by reference to unpublished, unreported, or unstated
251 (1981). On the confusion of courts over whether to examine legislative "motive" in
the constitutional context, see Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Prob-
lem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95; Ely, Legislative
and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
168 For a discussion 6f the advantages and limitations of the "agency" model, see
Mac Callum, supra note 165, at 782-84.
169 There is ample evidence to support this assumption. See, e.g., Newman, Be-
tween Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of Institutional Values,
72 CALIF. L. REV. 200, 209-10 (1984).
170 Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitu-
tion, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 263, 272 (1982); see also Mac Callum, supra note 165, at
762-63 (it is too "tedious" for courts to look behind legislators' spoken words for their
true meaning).
171 See, e.g., Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 485-87 (1981).
172 See R. DICKERSON, supra note 41, at 134-35.
173 L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 63-65 (1969).
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legislative preferences cannot be fully comprehensible to its audience.
Nor would such a statute serve the related goal of encouraging
legislative candor. As Posner argues, limiting the judicial search for leg-
islative intent "to public materials offsets to some extent the distortions
that voter ignorance introduces into the operation of a democratic polit-
ical system."1' 4 By refusing to credit the unspoken motives of legisla-
tors, courts encourage lawmakers to spread their genuine views on the
public record, where constituents and opponents can see them.
As between agency and court, it is likely that the agency is again
in a better position to elucidate the understanding of a statute's audi-
ence. First, the administering agency is itself a member of the legisla-
tive audience and, indeed, is usually its most important member. The
statutes whose interpretation is the subject of this Article are essentially
instructions from legislatures to agencies.1 75 Because such statutes con-
fer powers and impose duties and constraints on an agency, that
agency's interpretations are entitled to special respect.
The trouble with this line of argument is that few statutes are
addressed exclusively to an agency. Unless Congress intended to ex-
clude judicial review,17 6 one must presume that the courts are also
among its intended audience. Why, then, should a court's genuinely
held belief about a statute's meaning merit less respect? One response is
that no matter how vigorously courts may assert "partnership" sta-
tus,117 agencies empowered by statute to promulgate rules, adjudicate
disputes, issue licenses, distribute benefits, or render authoritative advi-
sory opinions may fairly claim to be the senior partners.
Another objection to the agency-as-audience argument is that most
regulatory statutes' audiences also include private parties whose con-
duct or status is subject to regulation by the administering agency.
178
174 Posner, supra note 170, at 273.
117 See Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitu-
tion, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 125, 167 ("Most significant legisla-
tion passed by Congress today is not addressed to the citizenry, but to supposedly ex-
pert administrative decisionmakers . . ").
171 See Southern Ry. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444, 454 (1978);
Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 501 (1977); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136, 140 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99,
105 (1977).
17 See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-52
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); ABA National Institute Proceed-
ings-Panel IV: Judicial Review of Agency Action, 26 AD. L. REv. 545, 576 (1974)
(statement of Judge James L. Oakes).
178 In Professor Dan-Cohen's terms, the "acoustic separation" between "decision
rules" (addressed to officials) and "conduct rules" (addressed to the regulated public) is
necessarily imperfect. Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 627, 635 n.21 (1984).
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The logic of Fuller's argument that law must be comprehensible to
those subject to it applies with greatest force to these private parties.
Since they have no authoritative interpretive power, their legitimate ex-
pectations must" be protected from the agencies and courts possessing
such power.
Still, it is uncertain that courts are better equipped than agencies
to know what those expectations are. Courts have contact with those
affected by a particular statute sporadically and selectively. Administer-
ing agencies customarily deal with them repeatedly. Organized or pow-
erful interest groups lobby agency officials, make frequent appearances
in official proceedings, and even supply agencies with members and
staff. Even unorganized constituents affect the agency, either directly
through myriad informal contacts or indirectly through their elected or
self-appointed representatives. Whether the legislature intended to
speak in "ordinary" or in technical language, one would generally ex-
pect the administering agency to have better insight than the courts into
the understanding of those affected by the statute.
3. Behavioral Consequences
Even under the lawfinding model, a correct identification of the
enactor's intention (as may reasonably be perceived by the statute's au-
dience) does not usually complete the interpretive process. Rarely will
the enactor have had in mind the specific situation confronted by the
interpreter. More likely, the enactor envisioned some general condition
or idea, or perhaps some specific ideals of a more general condition."x 9
The lawfinder must then take a final and more avowedly creative step
of determining which "interpretation" of the statute will produce that
general condition. To do this, the interpreter needs knowledge about
the behavioral consequences of adopting particular interpretations.
Adopting one possible interpretation of a statute over another may
have profound implications for the behavior of persons subject to the
statute. In Schweiker v. Gray Panthers,18 0 for example, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services had interpreted the Medicaid statute to
permit states to include a portion of a spouse's income in determining
certain applicants' eligibility for benefits. Presumably the Secretary had
to weigh carefully the consequences of making that decision. Allowing
inclusion of spousal income might reasonably have been expected to
reduce federal and state Medicaid payments by limiting the number of
171 See, e.g., Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV.
L. REv. 593, 627 (1958); Landis, supra note 4, at 889.
119 453 U.S. 34 (1981).
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persons qualifying for benefits. But it might also have discouraged
spouses from working or encouraged couples to separate or to conceal
income. Not only would these side effects be unfortunate in their own
right, but they might impose greater burdens on the Treasury by in-
creasing enforcement costs or expanding eligibility for Medicaid and
other welfare programs.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services should be better
equipped than a court to predict the nature, magnitude, and incidence
of these consequences. She heads a staff of skilled investigators and ex-
pert analysts, has the resources to hire outside experts, and has close
and regular contacts with representatives of persons and groups likely
to be affected by the decision-such as the state Medicaid agencies, the
various social service agencies, and health care providers."' 1 Her de-
partment may, in addition, have direct experience with analogous situa-
tions from which it can infer the consequences of a decision. Compared
to agencies, courts possess only limited investigative resources and ana-
lytical faculties. They must rely, therefore, on less accurate estimates of
consequential impacts.182 Thus, agencies seem to have greater access to
the knowledge necessary to understand what is intended by statutory
enactors.
B. Interpretive Process
Even though courts may be less knowledgeable than agencies
about the factors behind statutory enactment and interpretation, they
may still generate better interpretive decisions by virtue of a superior
"technology" of production. Defenders of independent review might ar-
gue that the adversarial process of appellate argument is the best means
of ascertaining the intention of an enacting legislature or the under-
standing of the statute's audience. Each advocate, after all, has an in-
centive to search for evidence supporting her preferred interpretation
and discrediting alternative interpretations. This contest is more likely
to result in "the truth" than is a nonadversarial investigation by a bu-
reaucratic entity, or so the argument goes.
Of course, agencies also often rely on an adversarial process to
generate the foundation for making interpretive judgments. There
181 See generally H. KAUFMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE FEEDBACK (1973) (a study of
nine federal agencies demonstrates an informational flow adequate to determine
subordinate noncompliance).
1.2 For extended attempts to demonstrate judicial incapacity to predict policy con-
sequences in particular contexts, see D. HoRwITz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY
(1977); R.S. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN
AIR ACT (1983).
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seems little basis to assume, on process grounds at least, that the Labor
Act is more likely to be misinterpreted by the NLRB in an unfair labor
practice case than by a court of appeals in an enforcement action.'8 3 At
most, this line of argument suggests that courts should give less defer-
ence to administrative interpretations rendered in an informal proceed-
ing such as rulemaking than to interpretations rendered in a formal
adjudication.
But even this limitation is unwarranted. Statutory interpretation is
not a strictly adversarial process even in the courts. In searching for
legislative meaning, judges and their clerks are not restricted to materi-
als presented by the parties. Nor should they be, since statutory inter-
pretation has precedential effects extending far beyond the immediate
litigants. Indeed, legislatures often create administrative agencies to
champion interests that would not find adequate expression in a tradi-
tional adversarial process. 8 When such an agency proceeds to make
policy in a more encompassing gesture, through a device like rulemak-
ing, the breadth of its inquiry may compensate for any deficiencies in
its depth . 85 In addition, the hierarchical process of internal review
within a bureaucratic decisionmaking process can provide much of the
discipline afforded by adversarial review. Consequently, courts do not
generally accord greater weight to an agency's interpretation, simply
because the interpretation resulted from a more formal interpretive
process.
C. Motive
The strongest argument for those who assert the superiority of
courts as lawfinders is that judges are less likely than agencies to allow
personal bias or self-interest to distort their reading of the enactor's
intent.186 Landes and Posner argue, for example, that courts (the "in-
dependent judiciary") have a stronger incentive than agencies (the "de-
pendent judiciary") to honor the enacting legislature's intent. 8
Headed by political appointees with short tenure in office and staffed
183 See Krent, Avoidance and Its Costs: Application of the Clear Statement Rule
to Supreme Court Review of NLRB Cases, 15 CONN. L. REv. 209, 223 (1983).
1'4 See, e.g., W. GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENcIES 5-14 (1941).
'85 Courts often claim to accord especially great deference to agency rulemaking
authority. See, e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775,
793 (1978); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977).
18' See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, supra note 8, at 110-11; Wellington, The Nature of
Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 493 (1982).
187 Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspec-
tive, 18 J.L. & EcON. 875, 879, 887-88 (1975).
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by bureaucrats interested in budgetary expansion,"" agencies are likely
to be much more responsive to the will of the current legislature than to
the will of some previous enacting legislature. Only the current legisla-
ture, after all, can punish or reward them. 8
Although this last point can be made about courts as well,190
Landes and Posner have argued that legislatures punish and reward
courts and agencies differently because they expect the two to serve dis-
tinct functions. While they expect agencies to respond to current policy
preferences, legislators want courts to follow the intent of the enacting
legislature. By faithfully enforcing legislative "deals" according to the
intention of the contracting "parties," courts enhance the durability of
those deals and hence the value of all legislators' votes.1 9 For this rea-
son, it is important for legislators to preserve the integrity of the inde-
pendent judiciary. If current legislators disagree with a position taken
by their predecessors in enacting a particular statute, therefore, they
would prefer to see that condition corrected by statutory amendment
rather than by an unfaithful judicial reading of the statute, because
such judicial lawmaking impairs the value of the courts as enforcers of
future legislative enactments. When a legislature entrusts implementa-
tion of a statute to an agency, by contrast, it insures that the "deal" will
remain flexible and adaptive to changing political fashions.
.Thus, according to this theory, courts and agencies will interpret
old statutes differently. If we value faithfulness to the enactor's inten-
tion, we should prefer interpretation by courts rather than agencies.
Even if one accepts the premise of this argument, however, it does not
clearly resolve our paradigm case where a legislature entrusted the ad-
ministration of a statute to an agency, subject to judicial review. Will a
reviewing court best effectuate legislative intent by enforcing its own
view of the enacting legislature's substantive intent, or by leaving un-
disturbed an agency interpretation, presumably responsive to the cur-
rent majority?
The motive argument in favor of judicial interpretation is further
188 See, e.g., R. ARNOLD, CONGRESS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: A THEORY OF
INFLUENCE 21 (1979). But see Lindsay, A Theory of Government Enterprise, 84 J.
POL. ECON. 1061, 1063 (1976) (claiming that the notion that government managers are
simply out to expand their budgets is "implausible").
189 See, e.g., Weingast & Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Con-
trol? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON.
765 (1983); Weingast & Moran, The Myth of Runaway Bureaucracy: The Case of the
FTC, 6 REGULATION, May-June 1982, at 33.
190 Indeed, Richard Posner has done so. R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 416 (1977). See also Michelman, Constitutions, Statutes, and the Theory of
Efficient Adjudication, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 431, 441-42 (1980).
191 Landes & Posner, supra note 187, at 877-79.
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weakened because observers disagree over the extent to which agencies
dance to the current legislature's tune. The "monopoly bureau" the-
ory 92 views administrators as relatively autonomous from their legisla-
tive sponsors and free to pursue self-serving objectives such as personal
prestige, future income, or promotion of an idiosyncratic view of the
public interest. 9 Some of these objectives surely counsel allegiance to
the will of the enacting legislature. For example, interest groups that
have invested heavily to secure the original legislative deal may offer
administrators substantial inducements to honor that deal.
194
Moreover, as Landes and Posner concede, courts are unlikely to be
especially responsive to the wishes of current legislatures. 95 Most ap-
pellate judges are at the apex of their careers and probably derive little
incremental satisfaction from expanded staffs or budgets. Since federal
judges in particular have life tenure and constitutional protection
against salary reduction, Congress can do little to harm them directly.
What, then, motivates judges? Some theorists suggest that judges
forego the larger financial rewards of private practice for the opportu-
nity to exercise power, achieve prestige, promote a personal conception
of the public good, or merely to enjoy greater leisure time. 96 The ex-
tent to which any of these objectives propel judges toward faithful ad-
herence to the will of some distant enacting legislature is difficult to
determine. A judge who derives great satisfaction from the opportunity
to be creative or to assert personal values would presumably prefer to
be freed from the bonds of the enactor's intent. Yet others will respond
more strongly to a personal ethic or perceived social ethic that con-
demns judicial creativity.
Even if we do not understand very well the motivations of agencies
and courts, our choice of interpretive method may respond to percep-
192 The leading example is W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT (1971).
19' See, e.g., Hilton, Regulatory Reform in Transportation: The Basic Behavior
of Regulatory Commissions, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 47, 47-49 (1972).
194 This is essentially the prediction of the "capture" theory, which asserts in gen-
eral terms that economic regulation is a process by which interest groups seek to pro-
mote their private interests. See Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J.
EcoN. 335, 341 (1974); see also M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPEN-
DENT COMMISSION 86-91 (1955). The capture hypothesis has been justifiably de-
bunked as neither universally true nor rigorously specified. See Posner, supra, at 341-
43. But it retains utility as an accurate characterization of the relationships between
many agencies and the industries they regulate. See B. OWEN & R. BRAEUTIGAM, THE
REGULATION GAME 2-9 (1978).
'" Landes & Posner, supra note 187, at 885.
1 See R. POSNER, supra note 190, at 415-17; see also Cooter, The Objectives of
Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE 107, 131 (1983) (suggesting that while
private judges are likely to make decisions that will maximize income, public judges are
likely to seek prestige among litigants, although out of weaker motivation).
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tions about the magnitude of their respective stakes in individual cases.
An agency clearly has a direct and substantial stake in the way in
which its charter is interpreted.'97 Of course, this fact alone does not
tell us which interpretation serves that interest in any particular case. A
decision in favor of administrative authority might confer desired power
and prestige or it might result in unwanted headaches.""8 Whether the
agency is a power-seeker or risk-avoider, however, the danger that self-
interest will infect the agency's reading of its statute is pronounced. By
contrast, courts of general jurisdiction have no comparable stake in the
interpretation of any particular statute. Whatever personal preferences
the judges might have, the outcome of any single case will rarely have
much impact upon them.
This difference can be overstated. For every decision significantly
affecting their jurisdiction, agencies probably make dozens or hundreds
of interpretive decisions of little moment. Likewise, judges are probably
aware when a particular case will have a greater impact on society or
their public image. As a general matter, however, it seems safe to con-
lude that a reviewing court will have less to gain or lose from the
outcome of an individual case than an administering agency. To the
extent that self-interest is likely to distort a lawfinder's search for objec-
tive meaning, this conclusion supports a preference for independent
review.
It is difficult to tease a general presumption in favor of either
mode of review from this analysis of courts and agencies as lawfinders.
If courts enjoy an edge on motivational grounds, arguments from
knowledge and process seem to favor agencies. None of these subsidiary
conclusions, moreover, rests on especially firm soil. To find a surer ba-
sis for choosing between independent and deferential review, then, we
must turn our attention to the lawmaking component of statutory
interpretation.
V. INTERPRETIVE COMPETENCE: INTERPRETATION AS
LAWMAKING
Statutory interpretation, like any form of literary interpretation, is
unavoidably an act of creating meaning. The very choice of principles
by which the search for meaning is to be guided stamps the inter-
197 Cf Wellington, supra note 186, at 489 (noting that entrenched bureaucracies
have both personal and political stakes in maintaining control over policy).
19I Compare, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968)
(upholding FCC's expansionary reading of its charter) with, e.g., FCC v. WNCN Lis-
teners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981) (upholding FCC's restrictive reading of its charter).
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preter's personality indelibly on the outcome of the inquiry.' 9 Further-
more, under almost any conceivable set of hermeneutic principles, ex-
ternal sources will not yield determinate answers to most questions.
However faithfully an interpreter may seek to reconstruct an enacting
legislature's "will" or ascertain an audience's "understanding," histori-
cal materials inevitably reach a point at which their capacity to provide
guidance is exhausted.2 00 At that point, the interpreter must necessarily
draw inspiration from her own personal values to complete the elabora-
tion of meaning.
To the extent that interpretation entails the making of such value
choices, the choice between independent and deferential review requires
a comparative assessment of courts' and agencies' lawmaking capacity.
The conventional wisdom, if there is one, favors agencies on this
score.2 °1 If agencies possess such an advantage, it must be based on a
belief either in the relative soundness of their policy decisions taken in
isolation, or in the internal coherence of their policy decisions taken in
the aggregate. In this section I evaluate these two claims in order.
A. Intrinsic Soundness
Other things being equal, we should assign primary interpretive
responsibility to that social institution which customarily incorporates
into its interpretive judgments the most sound conception of social pol-
icy. One cannot make that determination, however, without first solving
two preliminary riddles, one empirical and the other normative. First,
what, if any, are the differences in the types of justifications given by
courts and agencies for their decisions? Second, by what criteria ought
we to evaluate their comparative merits?
The answer to the former question may lie in a consideration of
the distinction between "policies" and "principles." ' The structural
differences between courts and agencies discussed in the previous sec-
tion lead agencies to invoke "policies" to justify their interpretive
choices, while courts prefer to invoke "principles." For example, be-
1' See, e.g., Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469, 471-76
(1981); Hermann, Phenomenology, Structuralism, Hermeneutics, and Legal Study:
Applications of Contemporary Continental Thought to Legal Phenomena, 36 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 379, 400-04 (1982).
200 See, e.g., R. DICKERSON, supra note 41, at 22-28; Hart, supra note 179, at
607.
201 See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, supra note 8, at 110-11; Winter, Judicial Review of
Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and the Court, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 53, 67-74.
202 See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 152, at 22-28; Wellington, Common Law
Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE
L.J. 221, 262-64 (1973).
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cause administrators are more immediately beholden to an elected legis-
lature and executive, administrative policymaking is likely to be some-
what more responsive than judicial policymaking to the preferences of
the prevailing political power structure. Since they are more bureau-
cratic and impersonal, moreover, agencies will tend to couch their value
choices in technocratic arguments rather than in expressions of either
individual conviction or enduring principle. Moreover, because of their
superior investigative, analytical, and monitoring capacity, agencies will
be encouraged to rely more heavily on utilitarian-instrumentalist justi-
fications for these decisions. By contrast, relatively isolated judges must
rely more on deontological reasoning.
These differences can be overstated, of course. The use of multi-
member appellate panels, for example, holds in check the likelihood
that courts will promote widely unpopular or unconventional views in
the name of principle.2"' Similarly, the "zone of indifference" 20 4 sur-
rounding all administrators leaves at least some room for the advance-
ment of personal conviction. As a gross generalization, however, the
"principle-policy" dichotomy captures an important kernel of truth
about judicial and administrative interpretation-as-lawmaking.
The question which type of justification we ought to prefer is un-
likely to yield a universal answer no matter what theory of social value
we choose to adopt. Some issues of statutory interpretation seem to cry
out for the invocation of durable, broadly applicable principles of the
sort elucidated by courts over a long period of time and in many diverse
contexts. Interpretation of statutory provisions that closely track consti-
tutional boundaries have this quality.205 So, too, do some questions in-
volving the meaning of basic "constitutional" statutes like the Sherman
Act 206 or the Administrative Procedure Act.20 7
Some commentators, notably Guido Calabresi, would have courts
adopt a universal "common law" approach to statutory interpreta-
tion-one that seeks to assimilate all statutes into a more encompassing
and stable conception of the legal "landscape". 0 ' But most have re-
203 See L. Kornhauser & L. Sager, Unpacking the Court (Dec. 1984) [unpub-
lished manuscript on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review].
204 The term is Chester Barnard's. See C. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE
EXECUTIVE 168-69 (1968).
205 See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (narrowly construing the Secre-
tary of State's authority to withhold passports, to avoid infringing upon constitutional
right to travel).
208 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
2.7 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-570 (1982).
208 G. CALABRESI, supra note 8; see also Note, supra note 44, at 913 ("Rather
than always being bound by the positive commands of a statute's words or professing
adherence to undefinable concepts of legislative intent or purpose, courts would explic-
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jected that view-correctly, I think-as fundamentally incompatible
with our constitutional and political traditions.2"9 Those traditions
counsel courts to view most statutes as discrete, self-contained expres-
sions of social policy.21° The elucidation of such pronouncements seems
to require not the invocation of broad regenerative principles but rather
the identification of the contours and implications of some particular
policy choice. Whether one takes a democratic or technocratic view of
social policymaking, administrative agencies, with their greater political
accountability and research tools, seem to be more appropriate vehicles
for making those choices.
B. Internal Coherence
On one level, an analysis of statutory interpretation involves an
abstract evaluation of the particular rules generated from specific fact
situations against some appropriate normative standards. On perhaps a
more useful level, the analysis focuses on statutory interpretation as a
component in the larger process by which social policy, as embodied in
the statute as a whole, is implemented. This perspective draws our at-
tention to the relationship of the parts to each other and to the whole.
As between courts and agencies we must determine which justification
will implement more coherently the underlying public policy of stat-
utes. In this section I distinguish five different aspects of "policy coher-
ence"-geographical uniformity, continuity over time, harmony with
related policies, integration of policy and enforcement, and expedition
of implementation-and examine the implications of deferential and in-
dependent review for each.
1. Geographical Uniformity
In the realm of statutory interpretation, policy coherence at its
most basic level seeks to assure that the same rules apply everywhere
within the political jurisdiction in which the statute applies. In a hier-
archical system of review in which a reviewing court oversees one or
more lower courts, the goal of uniformity argues in favor of indepen-
dent review. Thus, appellate courts apply an independent standard
itly reason from and develop statutory principles in the tentative, incremental fashion of
common law.") (footnotes omitted).
20" See sources cited supra note 9.
110 See Weisberg, supra note 3, at 230 (noting that "[w]ithin their realm, statutes
were all-powerful, but that realm was narrowly defined, and statutes had no legal
significance beyond it" in nineteenth century jurisprudence).
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when reviewing a trial court's conclusions of law.21' Were they to ap-
ply a deferential standard to each trial court's conclusions, inconsistent
rules of law within a single jurisdiction might develop. For the same
reason, we expect heads of administrative agencies to apply indepen-
dent judgment when reviewing the legal or policy decisions of their
subordinates.212
Judicial review of administrative actions at the federal level, how-
ever, turns the pyramid on its head. Any single agency is subject to
review by many different federal courts. 213 In such a system, indepen-
dent review will almost certainly produce less uniformity than deferen-
tial review.214 Since deferential review is more likely to result in accept-
ance of the agency's choice, differences of opinion among multiple
reviewers is less likely than under an independent standard. Disagree-
ment between courts and agencies will occur most frequently within the
"lawmaking" domain of statutory interpretation. Judges and agencies
making interpretive judgments are likely to rely on different values and
to foresee different consequences in any given situation. These differ-
ences will be more pron6unced than those relating to standard mean-
ings of statutory terms or special connotations indicated in legislative
commentary. Since deference will result in the displacement of judicial
judgment primarily in the former realm, it should further reduce disa-
greement among reviewing courts. Of course, higher level appellate re-
view can resolve those disagreements that do occur. But, because of the
nature of the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction, that solution is
time-consuming, expensive, and, largely for those reasons, unreliable.
211 See Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 755-56
(1982) ("[Tlhe trial judge's decision is accorded no deference beyond its persuasive
power, as in the case of determinations of the proper rule of law. . . ."); Stern, Review
of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 HARV.
L. REV. 70, 113 (1944) ("[N]o reason of policy and no rule or statute require that the
trial court's judgment as to the application of a rule of law to the facts found be binding
to any extent on the appellate court.").
212 See Cass, Allocation of Authority Within Bureaucracies: Agency Review in
Adjudication [unpublished manuscript on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review].
212 See Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action:
Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1975) ("Congress has fre-
quently . . . provide[d] for review by three-judge trial courts, by the courts of appeals
generally, by a single court of appeals, or by a more or less specialized tribunal.");
McGarity, Multi-Party Forum Shopping for Appellate Review of Administrative Ac-
tion, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 302, 304 (1980) ("[T]he venue provisions of individual
agency statutes commonly allow for review in several possible circuits.").
214 See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 & n.12
(1980) ("[A] court that tries to chart a true course to the [Truth in Lending] Act's
purpose embarks upon a voyage without a compass when it disregards the [Federal
Reserve Board's] views.").
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In assessing the uniformity argument, one must gauge the conse-
quences as well as the frequency of variance.21 5 Maintaining incompat-
ible rules of law within a common territory is obviously intolerable, but
stare decisis can hold this problem in check. The more common prob-
lem is the existence of different interpretations in different federal cir-
cuits. Consideration of a common issue by multiple circuits may im-
prove the quality of the ultimate resolution of the issue,216 but parallel
review imposes potentially severe costs on anyone doing business in
more than one circuit. At a minimum, this includes the administrative
agency itself, which must then tailor its enforcement procedures to the
interpretation prevailing in each circuit. Similarly, national companies
or organizations subject to statutory regulations may be unable to econ-
omize by standardizing operations.
2. Continuity
A second level of policy coherence is concerned with assuring the
continuity of policy over time. Although deferential review seems to en-
courage uniformity, independent review appears to be better suited to
promoting continuity. Judicial interpretation of the "correct" statutory
meaning permits no subsequent modification by the agency. Judicial
approval of a contested interpretation as merely "reasonable," on the
other hand, implies that alternative meanings could also lie within the
bounds of reason. Presumably the agency would remain free to adopt
one of those interpretations at a later time. Thus, for example, the Sec-
retary of Health, Education, and Welfare could perhaps have decided
at some time subsequent to the decision in Batterton v. Francis2 17 to
require states to include strikers within the ranks of the "unemployed."
By implicitly sanctioning multiple readings of a statutory provision,
deferential review encourages greater variation in administrative policy
over time.
Such fluctuations in policy may disrupt settled patterns of behavior
or destroy the value of investments made in reliance on an earlier inter-
215 See, e.g., Schaeter, Reducing Circuit Conflicts, 69 A.B.A.J. 452 (1983); Wal-
lace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a Moun-
tain or a Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 913 (1983) (reviewing the costs of various
proposals to increase uniformity).
116 See United States v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568, 572 (1984) ("Allowing only one
final adjudication would deprive this Court of the benefit it receives from permitting
several courts of appeals to explore a difficult question before this Court grants certio-
rari."); Commission on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Inter-
nal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 219 (1975) (noting
that some issues benefit from "'successive considerations by several courts' ").
217 432 U.S. 416 (1977).
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pretation. Following Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Sena-
torial Campaign Committee,2" 8 for example, national political parties
might invest heavily in strengthening their national senatorial campaign
committees. Reversal by the FEC would force them to rebuild
atrophied state committees. Changing the rules might, on balance, be
worse than consistent adherence to either of the two policies.
But consistency over time is not always a virtue. Maintaining a
uniform interpretation in the face of changing circumstances or en-
hanced knowledge can be pernicious. If at some subsequent time a
party's state committees became so weak or subservient to the national
organization as to make the "agency" relationship utterly superficial,
the FEC ought to have discretion to reverse its policy. A deferential
judicial endorsement of the original ruling allows for this result without
requiring the agency to convince either the Court to overrule its deci-
sion or Congress to amend the law.
Deferential review would be unwise if agencies could not be
trusted to distinguish between justified and foolish consistencies. But
that view is unwarranted. Those whose interests will be adversely af-
fected by a change in policy can usually be counted upon to bring that
fact forcefully to the agency's attention. And even though these interests
are not always fully represented," 9 the incremental benefits to be
gained are not worth the cost of eliminating any avenue of administra-
tive adjustment. Courts have adequate means short of an ex ante prohi-
bition of subsequent modification for policing those occasional errors.
One device is to accord no deference to an agency whose interpretation
has been "inconsistent" over time.22 A less restrictive judicial con-
straint imposes on agencies an extra burden of explanation when they
change any settled policy.22 By restricting the agency's subsequent in-
terpretive freedom, these doctrines make it more difficult for agencies to
change their policies. In such a regime, agencies will presumably at-
218 454 U.S. 27 (1981).
21 See Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65,
98-101 (1983) (communication of social costs and benefits of regulations).
220 See, e.g., North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522-23 n.12 (1982)
(reviewing Department of Education regulations of sex discrimination); Rowan Cos. v.
United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253, 258-62 (1981) (noting inconsistency of Treasury
Regulations defining wages); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976)
(discussing EEOC guideline for employee disability plans).
221 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103
S. Ct. 2856, 2866 (1983) ("[A]n agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is
obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be re-
quired when an agency does not act in the first instance."); Office of Communication of
the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1425-26 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
("[A]brupt shifts in policy do constitute 'danger signals' that the Commission may be
acting inconsistently with its statutory mandate.") (footnote omitted).
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tempt to alter settled statutory interpretations only for very good
reason.
The choice between these two devices depends on one's diagnosis
of administrative behavior. Which is the greater problem: bureaucratic
inertia or capriciousness? If the latter, a stronger counterweight against
improvident policy change is warranted. My reading of the literature
on administrative behavior, however, suggests that inertia blocks desira-
ble change at least as often as capriciousness precipitates harmful
change.222 If this diagnosis is correct, the burden of explanation ap-
proach is the preferable corrective.
3. Harmony
Invariably the policy choice reflected in any question of statutory
interpretation is embedded in a larger mosaic of policy judgments.223
Whether the Secretary of HHS should permit states to exclude strikers
from the "unemployed fathers" program, 24 for example, may affect the
size of benefit payments, the level of federal financial participation, the
income and asset test for eligibility, or the durational test for determin-
ing "unemployed" status. Successful implementation requires that indi-
vidual policy choices harmonize with the position taken on related
issues.22
Deferential review gives agencies greater freedom to select a statu-
tory reading that reinforces policies that they have already adopted or
intend to adopt.226 This is not to say that courts, operating in an inde-
pendent mode, need be insensitive to these concerns. But because agen-
cies are more familiar with the range of policy choices likely to be af-
fected by the interpretation at hand, there is little reason to expect
courts to do a better job of reconciling these competing policies. More-
222 There is an extensive literature on the tendency of bureaucracies to become
rigidified. See, e.g., M. CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON 175-208 (1964);
A. DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 158-66 (1967); G. TULLOCK, THE POLITICS OF
BUREAUCRACY 221-24 (1965).
22 See, e.g., H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 25, at 1320-23 (discussing distinc-
tions among legislative and interpretive regulations and enforcement rulings).
224 See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977) (upholding authority of Secre-
tary of HEW to promulgate a regulation allowing participating states to exclude strik-
ers from their definition of unemployed for the purpose of measuring AFDC-UF aid
because the statute expressly delegates to the Secretary the power to determine the
standards for unemployment).
225 On policy implementation, see generally E. BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTA-
TION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A BILL BECOMES A LAW (1977); J. PRESSMAN
& A. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION (1984).
221 See, e.g., Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315
(1933) (noting the agency's "responsibility ...of making the [statute's] parts work
efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new").
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over, because the agency will typically experience a significant portion
of the disruption caused by adopting an ill-fitting policy, it has ample
incentive to select a harmonious interpretation.
This logic applies, of course, only within the agency's policy do-
main. To the extent that an interpretation presents problems of con-
formity to policies maintained or enforced by other entities, precisely
the reverse conclusion is in order. The agency will very likely have less
knowledge than a reviewing court about the adverse external conse-
quences of its policies and will, in any event, have little incentive to
minimize those consequences. For this reason, courts correctly refuse to
defer to an agency's interpretation of statutes of general applicability.
227
For the same reason, courts are less likely to defer to an agency whose
policymaking powers are severely truncated.228 As a general matter,
however, so long as an agency has apparent authority to issue binding
interpretations through rulemaking or adjudication,229 the goal of har-
monious policy development favors deferential review of statutes to
which those powers pertain.
4. Integration
Successful policy implementation requires a synergy between the
making and enforcement of policy. In theory, the design of an enforce-
ment apparatus follows the articulation of policy goals. But in reality,
organizational rigidities and resource constraints often severely limit the
effective range of enforcement tactics.230 Abstract policy decisions
adopted without careful attention to those constraints may be distorted
beyond recognition in the process of their application by inspectors,
prosecutors, and arbiters. The notorious preference among regulators
for specification standards rather than performance standards, for ex-
ample, reflects the importance of administrability in the design of legal
rules.231
227 See, e.g., Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102 (1980) (holding that section 6(b)(1) of the Consumer Product Safety Act governs
disclosures made by the CPSC as a result of a request under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act).
228 See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (judicial review of
administrative decisions under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
229 See infra text accompanying notes 239-47.
20 See generally Diver, A Theory of Regulatory Enforcement, 28 PUB. POL'Y 257
(1980) (discussing the value of combining the use of top-down and bottom-up perspec-
tives by policymakers in order to enhance enforcement effectiveness through the "more
discriminating use of structural, procedural, and behavioral strategies").
21 See generally E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROB-
LEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982) (discussing the manifestations of
regulatory "unreasonableness," the possibility of a more flexible style of enforcement,
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The greater freedom of interpretation afforded to agencies by def-
erential review expands their capacity to integrate enforcement with in-
terpretive policy. Once again, the likelihood that agencies will in fact
use that freedom to enhance policy coherence depends on the scope of
their responsibilities. An agency possessing exclusive responsibility for
the enforcement of a statutory provision is most likely to achieve inte-
gration of policy and enforcement. Direct experience will provide it
with superior knowledge about the constraints on and costs of enforce-
ment. It has an incentive to minimize the costs of inefficient enforce-
ment, moreover, since it bears those costs directly. When the agency
shares enforcement responsibility with private citizens, an independent
enforcement agency like the Justice Department,232 or others, however,
the case for deference becomes weaker.
5. Expedition
A final measure for evaluating policy implementation is the rate at
which official acts are translated into primary behavior. One factor
plausibly affecting that rate is the standard of review applied by courts
to actions of agencies charged with administering a statute. Deferential
review might be thought to accelerate the rate of policy implementation
by making agency decisions appear more final. As discussed earlier,
deferential review ought to reduce the number of judicial challenges to
an agency's interpretive judgments. 33 To that extent, one might expect
policy decisions grounded on those interpretations to take effect sooner
and more decisively than if subjected to protracted judicial review.
Merely reducing the volume of judicial challenges, however, need
not increase the rate of compliance. Indeed, the failure of one affected
party to challenge a controversial agency interpretation may simply
prolong the uncertainty faced by others affected by the ruling. If the
regulated population is more inclined to defy than comply with a ruling
pending judicial resolution, early judicial review better serves the goal
of expedition. But judicial adoption of a deferential posture will pre-
sumably affect the compliance calculation. Knowing in advance that an
agency's interpretation will be treated with deference, the regulated
population is more likely to comply with the agency's ruling. Conse-
quently, even if deferential review were to delay definitive judicial reso-
lution, it could accelerate the rate of overall compliance.
and considering the alternatives of "indirect regulation").
232 See Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 393, 407-08 (1981).
233 See supra text accompanying note 159.
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The social value of expeditious policy implementation is not every-
where the same, of course. On occasion courts have singled out this
feature as providing an especially strong justification for judicial defer-
ence. In Haig v. Agee,234 for example, the Supreme Court based its
decision upholding a State Department rule partly on the ground that
the Secretary of State required broad flexibility to respond quickly to
rapidly changing international events. Similarly, in Democratic Senato-
rial Campaign Committee the Court noted that the Federal Election
Commission "must decide issues charged with the dynamics of party
politics, often under the pressure of an impending election."2 ' In such
situations, the Court has apparently valued the importance of acting
quickly and decisively more than the importance of acting deliberately.
While this emphasis may not be called for in other regulatory contexts,
expedition is a virtue that ought generally to be cultivated. To the ex-
tent that deferential review accelerates compliance by raising the esti-
mated cost of defiance, it should be favored over independent review.
VI. A PRESUMPTIVE RULE OF DEFERENCE
Not surprisingly, abstract comparisons of the relative competencies
of courts and agencies engaging in statutory interpretation yield no re-
sounding victories for advocates of either independent or deferential re-
view. Courts and administrative agencies are too complex, diverse, and
adaptive to permit decisive comparison of their abilities as lawfinders.
Agencies, in particular, come in such a wide variety of shapes, sizes,
and functions that one hesitates to venture even modest generalizations
about their ability to discern congressional intent and audience under-
standing. And even to the extent that differences in lawfinding capacity
appear, they rarely push uniformly in one direction.
Although a comparison of courts and agencies as lawmakers points
to a general conclusion that agencies are more appropriate interpreters
than courts, the preceding discussion should demonstrate the folly-if
not the futility-of attempting to frame any simple, universal rule for
assigning interpretive responsibility. The original Bumpers Amendment
calling for de novo judicial review of all agency rulings23 6 was as ex-
travagant as the caricature of judicial abdication to which its supporters
claimed it was an antidote. The erratic behavior exhibited by many
courts confronting this issue seems to suggest that there is no coherent
middle ground between these two unacceptable extremes. In justifying
2 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
25 Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. at 37.
23. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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their choice of interpretive mode, these courts seem to invoke too may
factors of indeterminate relative weight to allow for a simple resolution
of the deference dilemma. 37
My resolution of the issue, however, is more optimistic. Since in-
terpretation is inherently a form of policymaking, courts should pre-
sumptively defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute under which
the agency exercises significant policymaking responsibility. Because
the argument that agencies make more coherent policy choices rests on
democratic and technocratic notions, however, it is appropriate to limit
this presumption to the area of an agency's delegated decisionmaking
responsibility and accumulated expertise. The statute that creates an
agency and defines the scope of its powers can be consulted to deter-
mine the margins of its policymaking responsibilities. 8 Within that
realm, deference by courts to an agency's views on the meaning of a
statute is appropriate. Outside that domain, courts should indepen-
dently decide questions of interpretation, giving the opinions of agencies
no greater weight than those of other litigants. The question explored
in this section, then, is how to locate the boundary line between those
two domains.
A. Significant Policymaking Responsibility
The indicia of policymaking responsibility are usually not hard to
identify. This responsibility is most evident where an agency is explic-
itly delegated the power to issue substantive rules. Courts frequently
refer to agency rulemaking authority as a justification for according
deference to an agency's interpretation." 9 One question that arises,
however, is whether the degree of deference should vary with the speci-
ficity of the delegated power. Courts often claim that it should. Thus,
in Batterton v. Francis,24 the Supreme Court accorded "more than
mere deference" to the Health, Education and Welfare Secretary's in-
terpretation of a statutory provision specifically empowering the Secre-
tary to define "unemployment. ' 24 1 In United States v. Vogel Fertilizer
Co.,242 by contrast, the Court accorded "less deference" to a Treasury
interpretation of the tax code embodied in a rule issued under a "gen-
237 See supra note 95.
25 For a similar argument, see Wright, Judicial Review and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1980).
29 See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981); National Muffler Dealers
Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476-77 (1979); FCC v. National Citizens Comm.
for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 793 (1978).
240 432 U.S. 416 (1977).
241 Id. at 426.
242 455 U.S. 16 (1982).
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eral authority" to "'prescribe all needful rules and regulations'" for
the Code's enforcement.24
The specificity of a rulemaking power may be useful in making a
prima facie determination of its applicability to the case at hand, as
will be discussed below.2 44 But, aside from this use, I see no value in
drawing fine distinctions of the sort suggested in Batterton and Vogel
Fertilizer. A broad rulemaking power is no less an indication of poli-
cymaking responsibility than is a narrow one. Indeed, the difficulty of
maintaining policy coherence increases as the scope of rulemaking
power enlarges.
Even absent any rulemaking authority whatsoever, agencies may
still be involved in significant policymaking through adjudication.245
Adjudicative power implies a responsibility to establish policy by the
gradual accretion of precedent. Exclusive power to enforce a statute re-
inforces this impression, since the selection of cases for investigation
and prosecution requires some evaluative criteria. But even without ex-
clusive power to initiate enforcement actions, an agency empowered to
adjudicate disputes over a statute's application should be accorded poli-
cymaking status for this purpose.24 6
243 Id. at 24.
244 See infra text accompanying notes 248-53.
245 See generally Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look
at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA.
L. REV. 485, 536-37 (1970) (suggesting a need to eliminate rulemaking/adjudicatory
distinctions and urging a move away from the "prescription of uniform procedures"
toward specific procedures "tailored to the distinctive functions of each individual
agency" with any uniformity arising out of "basic similarities in agency functions");
Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Adminis-
trative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965) (discussing possible benefits from an
increased use of rulemaking procedures that could result from a "reexamination of cer-
tain conceptual distinctions" supporting some court decisions and an increased delega-
tion of rulemaking authority to agencies).
248 Cf Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3
VAND. L. REV. 470, 489-90 (1950) (whether an agency chooses to regulate generally or
by a "particular order approach, . . . the same fundamental elements of administrative
discretion are present, and the same fundamental standards of judicial review must be
applied . . . ."). In fact, however, courts often accord no overt deference to interpreta-
tions by agencies with purely adjudicative authority. See, e.g., Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Dep't of Labor v. Perini N. River
Assocs., 459 U.S. 297 (1983) (interpretation of Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act by Labor Department's Benefits Review Board accorded no defer-
ence); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (agreeing with interpretation of Justice
Department's Bureau of Immigration Appeals, but with no discussion of deference).
Occasionally, two different administrative agencies have responsibility for issuing
rules and adjudicating disputes under the same statutes. In such cases, courts ought to
defer to the rulemaking agency. See, e.g., National Indus. Sand Ass'n v. Marshall, 601
F.2d 689, 698 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding Secretary of Labor's interpretation of a regula-
tion he promulgated worthy of "great deference"); Clarkson Constr. Co. v. Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 531 F.2d 451, 457 (10th Cir. 1976) (accord-
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An agency possessing only the power to issue advisory rulings
presents a much weaker claim for deferential review. Early cases in-
volving judicial review of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
guidelines illustrate the problem.24 7 On the one hand, the fact that Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act may be enforced by private action in
federal courts implies that courts have substantial policymaking respon-
sibility. On the other hand, the EEOC clearly possesses greater conse-
quential knowledge about practices subject to the Act than do the
courts. Moreover, EEOC guidelines avoid the problems of delay and
intercircuit variation endemic to judicial enforcement. Under the cir-
cumstances, EEOC guidelines play an important role in the implemen-
tation of the Act, and courts should thus defer to the Commission's
interpretations of the statute.
B. Jurisdiction
That an agency possesses policymaking tools is not, by itself, suffi-
cient to render its statutory interpretations eligible for deferential re-
view. The interpretation at issue must fall within the domain of that
policymaking activity. The problem of circularity is obvious: whether
an agency's rulemaking or adjudicative responsibilities encompass a
particular subject is often precisely the issue of statutory interpretation
confronting the reviewing court. The issue in Batterton, for example,
was whether the Secretary's conceded authority to define "unemploy-
ment" by rule included the authority to permit states to exclude strikers
from welfare eligibility.2 8 One cannot determine the appropriate stan-
dard of review by assuming the very power being contested.
Although this circle is logically seamless, it may be broken by in-
voking a notion akin to subject-matter jurisdiction. So long as an
agency otherwise equipped with policymaking tools has prima facie ju-
risdiction over the subject of the interpretation in question, the pre-
sumption of deference should apply. This test is met when the statutory
provision whose interpretation is at issue is expressly covered by a dele-
gation of rulemaking or adjudicative power. Batterton represents the
clearest case: the very statutory term whose meaning was con-
tested-"unemployment"-was contained in a sentence that delegated
to the Secretary of HEW power to "prescribe" "standards" for its de-
ing deference to interpretation urged by Secretary of Labor, who had promulgated the
regulation in question).
24 Compare Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) ("great defer-
ence" accorded to EEOC interpretation) with General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125 (1976) (little or no deference accorded).
248 Batterton, 432 U.S. at 417-18.
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termination. But most delegations of rulemaking or adjudicative power
identify clearly the substantive provisions that lie within their field of
application. For example, even though the Treasury's rulemaking
power under the Internal Revenue Code is expansively defined, there
was no question that it applied to the specific statutory provision at
issue in Vogel Fertilizer.249 For purposes of justifying a presumption of
deferential review, such clear applicability should have been sufficient
evidence of the Treasury's policymaking responsibility.
Admittedly, ambiguities sometimes exist concerning the jurisdic-
tional scope of delegated powers.250 But a review of the cases suggests
that ambiguities are rare and, when they do arise, can be adequately
handled by resolving doubts in favor of the agency. The one exception
to this presumption should be for statutory provisions arguably applica-
ble to two or more agencies. Consumer Product Safety Commission v.
GTE Sylvania Corp.2 51 is illustrative. Section 6(b)(1) of the Consumer
Product Safety Act252 restricted the right of the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC) to disclose product information to the pub-
lic. The CPSC interpreted section 6(b)(1) to apply only to voluntary
disclosures by the CPSC, not to disclosures mandated by the Freedom
of Information Act.253 On review, the Supreme Court correctly ac-
corded no deference to the agency's interpretation. Although section
6(b)(1) is part of the statute exclusively enforced by the CPSC, the
Freedom of Information Act applies to all federal agencies. The inter-
action of the two statutes thus raises issues of general application that a
court ought not to entrust to any single agency. In such contexts, the
interests of uniformity, continuity, harmony, and integration can be
served far more effectively by a hierarchical court system than by an
atomistic collection of agencies. For similar reasons, courts must inde-
pendently resolve jurisdictional disputes between agencies."r '
249 The provision of the Internal Revenue Code at issue was 26 U.S.C. § 1561(a)
(1982). The Treasury's rulemaking power extends to "all needful rules and regulations
for the enforcement of ... title [26]." 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (1982).
250 See, e.g., Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 104
S. Ct. 2778, 2782 (1984) ("Sometimes the legislative delegation to any agency on a
particular question is implicit rather than explicit.").
252 447 U.S. 102 (1980).
252 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(1) (1982).
258 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
25 Conflicts of this sort sometimes arise when the Justice Department attempts to
enforce the antitrust laws against an industry regulated by another agency. The resolu-
tions have varied. See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422
U.S. 694 (1975) (narrowly construing the Investment Company Act of 1940 to avoid
displacing the antitrust laws); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963) (the Bank Merger Act of 1960 cannot immunize mergers from challenge under
other federal antitrust laws); United States v. Radio Corp. of Am. 358 U.S. 334 (1959)
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C. The "Reasonableness" Constraint
Even with the foregoing caveat, the presumptive rule I have sug-
gested may be attacked as too broad. Not every interpretation rendered
by agencies acting within the outer limits of their policymaking juris-
diction necessarily deserves judicial deference. The question is whether
the effort to refine the rule further is worth the resulting increase in its
complexity. Courts act as though it were. Judicial decisions bristle with
additional factors that allegedly strengthen or weaken the case for def-
erential review of an agency's interpretation-the interpretation's age
and consistency, the need for prompt agency action, or the formality of
the procedure for its adoption.25 These considerations plausibly relate
to the underlying justifications for deference recited earlier in this Arti-
cle. But my own view is that their incorporation into an explicit rule of
deference causes more mischief than it cures. By increasing legal uncer-
tainty, a complex rule of deference increases the likelihood of litigation.
This, in turn, diminishes the value of deference as a means to enhance
the uniformity, expedition, harmony, and integration of public policy.
The cost of an overbroad rule of deference, moreover, is held in
check by the "reasonableness" safeguard. 56 Deferential courts can and
should still reject interpretations that strike them as incompatible with
the legislative mandate, as viewed through the lawfinder's lens. The
efficacy of this safety valve depends, of course, on its specifications and
operation. A "reasonableness" test can become so elastic as to allow
courts effectively to nullify any formulation of a deference rule. Unhap-
pily, no amount of academic pontification can make "reasonableness"
dramatically less elastic. Indeed, I have often wondered whether anyone
will improve on Louis Jaffe's celebrated formulation, written twenty
years ago: "[W]here the judges are themselves convinced that [a] cer-
tain reading, or application, of the statute is the correct-or the only
faithful-reading or application, they should intervene and so
declare.
'2 57
The suggestion is that courts should reject an administrative inter-
pretation that will unfairly surprise the statute's nonofficial audi-
ence. 258 Such an interpretation is one that cannot be supported by the
words of the statute, as the court believes them to be understood among
(FCC approval of a transaction does not protect it from subsequent challenge as a
violation of the antitrust laws).
2'5 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
258 See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
257 L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 572 (1965).
258 See supra text accompanying notes 172-73.
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the relevant "community of interpreters." '259 Such an interpretation is
presumably also one that, while compatible with the text, was appar-
ently considered and rejected, or is quite similar to one considered and
rejected, by the enacting legislature, as reliably revealed in the publicly
accessible legislative history. Finally, the courts should find unreasona-
ble an interpretation that runs counter to a well-focused purpose made
manifest in the statutory text or public legislative history. Admittedly,
such a reformulation of the "reasonableness" constraint runs the risk of
being "either a crashing platitude or a resounding rationalization." 260
But it should at least caution courts to adopt a modest view of their role
in reviewing the interpretive judgments of agencies operating within
their policymaking spheres. In essence, I am proposing that courts con-
sciously restrict their independent judgments to the "cognitive" core of
interpretation261 where constitutional notions of legislative supremacy
and conventional notions of institutional competence conspire most
strongly against administrative hegemony.
CONCLUSION
In one sense, I have labored mightily in this Article to defend the
status quo, for judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of "its"
statute is surely the norm in contemporary administrative law. But, as
we know from casual observation," 2 specific case studies,263 and admit-
tedly crude efforts at empirical estimation,26 4 it is a norm with many
exceptions. Those exceptions attest to the persistence of the older com-
peting tradition of independent judicial construction of regulatory
statutes.
The persistence of that tradition forever reminds administrators
how fragile is their hold on interpretive prerogatives. Deference, how-
ever frequently conferred, seems always to be an act of judicial grace, to
be withheld whenever some reviewing court's overdeveloped olfactory
sense detects the odor of administrative waywardness.26 5 To those who
259 See Abraham, supra note 6, at 685-86.
260 L. JAFFE, supra note 257, at 572.
281 See R. DICKERSON, supra note 41, at 21-22.
.2 See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 133, at 1166-67 (courts less deferential in the
1970's than in earlier decades).
263 See, e.g., R.S. MELNICK, supra note 182, at 343-45.
'4 See, e.g., L. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT 120-44
(1982); Gardner, Federal Courts and Agencies: An Audit of the Partnership Books,
75 COLUM. L. REv. 800 (1975); O'Reilly, supra note 19, at 780.
265 Judges sometimes attempt to describe the factors that cause them to "cock a
skeptical eye" at agencies. See, e.g., Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the
Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 523-24 (1974).
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view scope of review unidimensionally, as a means of controlling a run-
away bureaucracy,266 this is as it should be. Deference should be re-
garded as a privilege, to be earned in each case by responsible behavior,
and not simply as an entitlement conferred by status alone. Adherents
of this view will resist my call for a strong and simplified presumption
of deference. They will argue that in the short run such a presumption
may not change outcomes in many individual cases, but that in the long
run it will weaken the disciplining force of judicial oversight and
thereby heighten the risk of administrative excess.
The answer presented and defended in this Article stems from a
conviction that standard of review cannot sensibly be perceived
unidimensionally. The choice of interpretive mode is a decision not sim-
ply about "controlling the bureaucracy," but about allocating interpre-
tive authority between the bureaucracies of court and agency.267 That
judgment can rest only on a comparative assessment of the capacities
and limitations of each. Viewing interpretation as an exercise simulta-
neously in finding and creating norms, I conclude that a strong pre-
sumption of deference to interpretations lying within an agency's prima
facie policymaking domain best accommodates the competing demands
for responsibility and initiative in the administrative state.
2. See Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. Ruv.
1276, 1334-38 (1984).
267 See Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Meaning:
"The High Road," 35 TEx. L. REv. 63, 64 (1956) (viewing courts as merely higher-
level "agencies" involved in the administration of statutes, which review "but a small
proportion of the determinations made below").
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